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Title: ISA’s technology reaches the Middle East – When Intelligent Senses are needed 
Anywhere.    
In the end of 2012, ISA – Intelligent Sensing Anywhere, a Portuguese technological-based 
company in the oil & gas and energy telemetry business which had started the operations of its 
International Joint Venture (IJV) in Cairo in the beginning of the year, was facing the tough 
decision on whether it should divest on the IJV.  
Although the partnership was stable and the first implemented pilot projects had been a 
success, Egypt was living a social and political crisis since 2011. This crisis had been recently 
aggravated with the election of President Mohammed Morsi with 51% of the votes, in a 
straight division of the country between Islamist governance and the moderate Muslims, 
Christians and liberals. Underlying ISA’s concerns were the security of its members, the 
decrease in investment regarding national projects, ISA’s future success in the North Africa and 
Middle East regions and the best interests of its stakeholders. The dilemma on whether the 
firm should go on with its IJV is therefore the central issue of this dissertation.  
In addition to the Case Study, this dissertation includes a Literature Review which provides the 
theoretical grounds for the proceeding analysis on the Teaching Note, exploring issues such as 
technological R&D, International Negotiation, Strategic Alliances and Sustainability in a SMEs 
internationalization context.  
 




Titulo: A tecnologia da ISA atinge o Médio Oriente – Quando os sentidos são precisos em 
todo o lado 
No fim de 2012, a ISA – Intelligent Sensing Anywhere, uma empresa portuguesa de telemetria 
cujas operações no mercado egípcio começaram através de uma International Joint Venture 
(IJV) no início do ano, deparava-se com a difícil decisão de continuar ou não no mercado.  
Embora a parceria fosse estável até então e a implementação dos projetos piloto tivessem sido 
um sucesso, o Egipto encontrava-se numa crise politica e social desde 2011. Esta situação foi 
recentemente agravada com a eleição do presidente Mohammed Morsi com 51% dos votos, 
dividindo o país entre uma governança Islâmica e os muçulmanos moderados, cristãos e 
liberais. Subjacentes às preocupações da ISA estavam a segurança dos seus trabalhadores, a 
diminuição do investimento no que toca a projetos no país, o potencial sucesso da ISA nos 
mercados do Norte de África e do Médio Oriente e os interesses dos seus stakeholders. O 
dilema sobre se a empresa deve ou não manter a IJV é, portanto, a questão fulcral  desta tese. 
Além de incluir um Estudo de Caso, esta tese inclui uma revisão de literatura que fornece as 
bases teóricas para a análise posterior  no capítulo da Teaching Note, explorando questões 
como a Investigação e Desenvolvimento (I&D) tecnológicos, Negociação Internacional, Alianças 
Estratégicas e Sustentabilidade num contexto de internacionalização das PME portuguesas. 
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I | Introduction  
In November 2012, ISA – Intelligent Sensing Anywhere, a Portuguese technological-based 
company in the oil & gas and energy telemetry business, was required to make a tough 
decision on its internationalization process. A company born as a start-up in 1990 by the hands 
of engineering college students was now internationally recognized and awarded for its 
innovation in the telemetry market and was now listed in NYSE Alternext.  
In order to compete internationally, ISA acknowledged the need to invest on technological 
R&D, to develop solutions which can remotely meter consumption in the areas of Oil, Energy, 
Environment, Transport, Security and Health Security and Automation. ISA was able to create 
innovative products and services in the market, and met the requirements of assuring higher 
energetic efficiency, cost reduction and real time information provided through business 
intelligence processes. 
Its products can be found in more than 20 countries worldwide including Egypt, where ISA 
established ISA Middle East, an International Joint Venture with an experienced partner in the 
market, with the aim of getting the knowledge and the experience required to be successful, 
and to reach other markets in North Africa.  
However, the social and political situation grew inversely to the development of the IJV. In July 
2012, Mohammed Morsi won the elections in Egypt, against Ahmed Shafiq, with 51% of the 
votes, which caused the political and religious division of the country between Islamists and 
Moderate Muslims, Christians and Liberals.  
For ISA’s concern, the tension lived in Cairo would soon burst up and become a civil war. ISA’s 
board would have to make a strategic decision that might change the path of that company in 
the Middle East  
This dissertation has the aim to demonstrate how a Small to Medium Enterprise could achieve 
an international recognition in the technological market, through the process of Business 
Intelligence and the development of telemetry solutions for B2B and B2C markets.  
Strategic alliances are going to be the core discussion of this paper. More precisely, this 
dissertation is going be focused on how SMEs can enter with and sustain its strategic alliances 
in culturally challenging markets.  
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To accomplish this goal, this dissertation will be divided into three parts: the Case Study, the 
Literature Review and the Teaching Note.  
In the Case Study, the firm, its vision, strategic moves and options will be presented. The 
Literature Review will contain specific frameworks and concepts with the aim of providing a 
theoretically basis that will be helpful in the analysis of the issues addressed in the Teaching 
Note. This last section aims to give guidance for an instructor on the described themes and 
help to stimulate the students’ in-class participation.   
In the Literature Review the strategic concepts and frameworks of relevant theorists which 
should be helpful for analyzing the questions proposed in the Teaching Notes section are 
highlighted. Finally, in the Teaching Note section an approach for the discussion of the Case 
Study is suggested. The goal of this section is to give a possible guideline for the instructor to 
use during class and to stimulate the class discussion. This last section is expected to be 




II | Case Study 
Henrique Pereira was staring at the world map, drumming his fingers on the table on a sunny 
day of November 2012, in Coimbra, Portugal, just before a meeting he had called up with his 
team. ISA – Intelligent Sensing Anywhere, a small to medium sized company in the 
technological field, with a turnover of 5,4 million euros in the year of 2011, decided it was time 
to take a hard step. Henrique Pereira had been hired in December 2010 by the company to 
lead the company into a new market, and now he had a letter from the administration and 
another from the shareholders with financial data attached on his hands. On the header, in 
bold letters, it was written what they had been discussing for a few days: “Time to change”.  
The world map was on Henrique's mind all week. A huge world map was all written upon, not 
only with seas and countries’ names but also with possibilities and market characteristics. 
Henrique gathered his team and told them: “It is time for us to go big or go home. Where 
should we go from here? Should we stay or should we go? How big a risk can we afford to run? 
This is a good day to make crucial decisions.” 
The team went back through all the decisions they took the past few years in order to decide 
in which markets should they reallocate resources, and which markets were worth entering.   
2.1. The Company 
In 1990, four newly-graduated physics and computer engineering students at the University of 
Coimbra, with fresh ideas and knowledge in the development of solutions of acquisition and 
transmission of data and remote control, decided to create a start-up.  ISA – Intelligent Sensing 
Anywhere, was soon to be a technology-based company, headquartered in Coimbra (see 
Exhibit 1).  
After years of developing and implementing solutions for monitoring and environmental 
control and benefiting from the evolution of mobile communication, ISA had become the 
world pioneer in the launching of telemetry solutions through GSM applied to the monitoring 
of tanks, nets, and gas meters. 
 For more than 20 years, ISA has specialized in intelligent telemetry and remote management 
solutions. Its core business consisted of creating and developing products and solutions in 
order to create value in different fields such as fuel distribution, energetic and hydric 
efficiency, environmental monitoring and intelligent houses and cities (see Exhibit 2). 
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“Intelligent Sensing Anywhere: We want to take our telemetry systems to all corners of the world, to 
every home, every car, every person, and every environment! We want to measure the quality of the air 
you breathe and of the water that drink, your energy consumption, your health and the status and 
location of all your assets... and then process these data in an intelligent way, thus building a better 
world!” 
The company’s vision stated the main goals that lead to the conceptualization of smart cities 
(Exhibit 3). Step by step ISA was aiming that every city would have a sustainable development 
that respected the environment by optimizing energetic efficiency through the offer of remote 
metering solutions that could make every health care, transportation and security company 
access information in real time.  
Although the company’s rivals included multinationals such as Schneider, Siemens, ABB, 
Honeywell, Pacific Controls and Johnson Controls, these firms did not concentrate on small 
niches, but on mass markets, which did not require customized solutions, translated in added 
value for a company like ISA. Henrique clarified that ISA’s technology and incorporated know-
how along with an almost exclusive market did not undermine companies with higher 
turnovers. 
Thus, ISA’s general strategy focused on the dominance of a very specific niche, with a 
technology that was not replicated so far, due to the protection of its patents and know-how. 
This provided a favorable position for ISA, especially on its main area of Oil & Gas. ISA had a 
team exclusively dedicated to Business Intelligence1 processes, which was able to raise the 
industry standards on Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications in the segment of Oil & 
Gas. Telemetry, which is ISA’s core business, makes the bridge in M2M communications, 
reinforcing its great potential among international competitors. 
2.2. The Core Strategy 
ISA’s offer was very similar across geographical areas – energy management and monitoring 
solutions grounded on telemetry as a technological component. Through the continuous 
collection of a large set of variables of energy consumption, the company was able to find 
inefficient patterns and then to bridge the gaps to raise efficiency, and consequently to save 
energy and money, a solution that was offered to consumers as the Smart Logistics service, to 
which ISA constantly added value in order to optimize the use of telemetry by the consumer.  
                                                          
1
 Business Intelligence is the process of collecting, storing, treating and diffusing data that can add value and 
efficiency to a company 
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Henrique explained through a medical analogy that what defined and distinguished the 
company was ISA’s approach to the problem: “a client of ours has a problem and consults a 
specialist. The majority of our competitors, by looking at our client, would immediately suggest 
solutions lined-up with their specialization – a surgery in case they are surgeons, for example. 
ISA prefers to do a complete and detailed diagnosis which identifies the existing problems and, 
based on this analysis, suggests better solutions. This not only saves money to clients, but also 
spares resources and promotes a different way of being efficient. If we see there is the need 
for surgery, we obviously will do it, but based on real data, not only on opinions and 
perceptions.” 
With this strategy ISA was able to successfully grow since its beginning. Although Henrique 
recognized that reality never happens exactly as planned, when confronted with cultural 
differences, the teams focused on the external markets endeavor to understand a different 
reality. In what concerns the Middle East and North African countries, the time required to 
close deals was larger than what they initially thought of.  
Nevertheless, Henrique always believed in what he was selling and tried to spread that 
confidence among his team members by remembering them of what had made them 
successful that far. The Key Success Factors matched across countries: high return on 
investment, the attained percentage of efficiency and the ability to create value to ISA’s clients 
(not only they are able to reduce costs, but are also able to differentiate from their 
competition and therefore give value to their own clients). Henrique highlighted to his team 
one factor that was particularly relevant for the Middle East: the importance of finding the 
right partner to be able to develop a trustful win-win business relationship.  
Furthermore, the firm’s strong efforts on Research and Development (see Exhibit 4) allowed to 
treat the information received from its clients and the macroeconomic environment and to 
turn it into innovative solutions.  
On 2011, ISA was able to beat the external crisis on the world economic markets by increasing 
40% of its total turnover (see Exhibit 5). This outcome was possible due to the opening of ISA 
Middle East and ISA South America (see Exhibit 6), as well as due to the enlargement of the 
spectrum of application of its technologies to new market and client segments2.   
                                                          
2
 ISA’s Annual report, 2011 
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2.3. The International Lever 
The team was aware that swimming in a world of sharks would not be easy. The small sized 
company was well known in the Portuguese energy and oil industry, with clients such as BP, 
Shell, Mobil, Total, Repsol and Galp, which measured their reservoirs anywhere in the world 
using ISA’s technology (see Exhibit 7).  
But the fact was that, as Henrique stated, “out of borders the firm was a micro, or even a 
nano, international player”. As so, the managers had to be extremely careful to avoid 
squandering the limited resources of the company. 
The firm soon begun to win relevant international contests, competing at the same level of 
other relevant players in the world market, and after 10 years it became the leader of the 
segment of multinational oil companies in what concerns the measurement of gas tanks 
worldwide.  
Thus, the replication of the business model from fuel to water and energy, turned out to be 
the rising point of ISA and its international projection. ISA’s presence around the 5 continents 
accounted for 70% of the company’s production3. It was possible to find ISA’s technology in 27 
countries, as 52 thousand telemetry systems had been installed. For the company, “this is only 
a starting point, not a point of arrival”.  
In 2005, ISA realized that some geographical areas required not only its exports, but also the 
physical presence of the company in order to further exploit the market, and defined three 
year long term internationalization plans, revising and adjusting them annually. In 2008, the 
company opened its subsidiaries in Spain, France and Brazil. “We need to have people who not 
only know the market but also feel it, that are able to understand its dynamics” – said 
Henrique. 
2.4. The Flashback 
In December 2010, Henrique was deliberately hired to be the Managing Director of the Energy 
business area of the company, being later on transferred to the international business 
development as a required step to lead the expansion strategy. After one year Henrique 
started to be directly involved on the process due to his previous experience as a manager in IT 
companies with global operations. 
                                                          
3
 Source: ISA’s Annual Report 2011 
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On the beginning of 2011, the top management was considering which areas were more 
relevant for the international expansion of ISA. At that time the administration saw the huge 
potential of four regions: Brazil, as an opening door for South America; the Middle East, 
because of the potential of its market; China, as a lever for the Far East; and the United States 
for the dimension and maturity of the market.  
The initial process for developing the entry strategy for a new market was already quite 
standardized. It consisted on revising the analysis of the firm’s internal competences and 
strengths. Then, all the relevant strengths and weaknesses of these four markets and what 
might affect its entrance were analyzed. The certain successful factor was undeniable for 
Henrique: “Being in a lot of countries is an essential strategy to mitigate the risk… if one ship 
sinks, we still stand”.  However, he felt that doing an accurate realistic match was the hardest 
step to overtake. 
All of these markets were probed before by sales representatives. In China, for instance, the 
firm had a commercial gateway since 2009 in Shenzen. Its partner was, on a contract 
manufacturing basis, a supplier of required electronic equipment for the production of each 
unit, which in this way would only need to be assembled in Portugal. The process was 
profitable when one is dealing with high quantities, said Henrique. Twice a year, 2 to 3 
employees were sent to Shenzen to control production and to build network in order to 
prospect the possibility of establishing, in the future, a physical presence of its own in the 
market. Although the Chinese population had a high purchasing power due to their industrial 
capacity, manufacturing and cutting-edge technology, the country had endless energy and 
environmental problems due to the fast industrialization and slovenly control which added to a 
substantial discrepancy on the degree of external openness to trade, made it less appealing.  
However, the government was now taking measures in order to reverse the pollution it had 
been so criticized for. Moreover, China was growing at a strong rate being the second largest 
economy and might soon surpass the United States.  
But “it was imperative to make a choice” – said Henrique. During the second trimester of 2011, 
the company had already prospected all markets and came to a consensus to make higher 
investments in only two of the options: Brazil and the Middle East. Henrique saw that the basis 
for this choice was mainly the opportunity for a faster entry in these markets and the difficulty 
to simultaneously focus on the four regions.  
After the strategy was approved by both administration and shareholders, the following step 
was to define the implementation procedures. 
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2.5. ISA South America 
In 2008, ISA had started a joint-venture in Brazil which did not pay off at the time as the firm 
had “the wrong strategy, the wrong partner and the wrong resources”, explained Henrique.  
Nevertheless, the growing Brazilian market could not be dismissed. As Henrique stated, “Brazil 
has it all – industry, research, growing knowledge and natural resources – the engine that 
Europe lacks”. However, Brazil had a strong protectionist policy. Firms that wanted to do 
business in Brazil had to settle there and to hire and train a minimum percentage of Brazilian 
workers, in order to increase local knowledge and employment.  
ISA started in Brazil as a wholly-owned subsidiary and its new strategic plan included SABESP 
as the main client. The local state owned company that provides water and sewage services to 
commercial, industrial and residential users in São Paulo state, covers 50km of São Paulo’s 
region, easily reaching 26.7 million customers - or 60% of this State’s population. ISA also 
escalated faster in this market due to the law for mandatory sub metering installment in 
condominiums. SABESP connected one new client per day and had, at this point, more than 7 
million active accounts, having ISA has it main supplier of telemetry systems.  
Henrique had been giving support to the activities in Brazil until June 2012, when the firm 
hired a general manager, a Portuguese engineer that had been living in Brazil for the last 
twenty years, to locally control ISA South America. He stated that “the Brazilian market is 
mainly attractive for its scale”. But for how long? Although the utility market was by far more 
competitive than the Portuguese one, Brazilian clients had lower resistance to change and 
therefore, they easily changed suppliers. Henrique believed that the World Cup in 2014 and 
the Olympic Games in 2016 would be the peak of its growth rate. However, by then, Brazil 
would already have the technical knowledge and economic strength to continue growing, and 
to keep being the economic power house of South America.   
2.6. ISA Middle East  
For several months in 2011, the team had been prospecting the markets of the United Arab 
Emirates, mainly Dubai, as well as Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. For each of them the team 
had evaluated its maturity and potential, and negotiated the frames for suitable partnerships. 
They thought of Jordan, “the poor parent of the Arab world”, in an attempt to leverage and 
find business in a sustainable area with the prospects of extending it to other countries. 
Nevertheless, the core reason was the inflated electricity price in the country that would 
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maximize ISA’s competitiveness on the energy sector.  In spite of being physically installed in 
the Middle East, the choice of having a partner with a big network was based on the need of 
being cost efficient at this early stage of the process. 
The same happened in Turkey, which was growing at a rhythm close to 2 digits4. A huge 
market which might open the doors for the Asian world. It had a central location close to 
Africa, the Middle East and the Arab World and yet, it did not culturally fit in any of these 
continents. A country which raised doubts and controversy among the team for not having 
solid relationships with any of these geographies. Notwithstanding, it had the size and 
opportunities for being profitable on a stand-along basis and ISA could take advantage of 
Turkey’s strategic vector towards Brazil, to easily create a partnership. For the past few weeks, 
the team had also been evaluating business proposals and Henrique was confident they were 
going to have the first projects by 2013.  
On the same stage, moving South, a giant was waiting for ISA. Saudi Arabia was a very 
interesting country for business once a person learned how to deal and respect the habits and 
culture. Nothing is more important for Saudis than a relationship built on trust, – said Henrique 
– and the best connection one can make in the country is with a respected and credible family. 
Moreover, although Saudi Arabia had a lot of historical conflicts with other countries, none of 
them was with Portugal, which could be beneficial for the company in the search for a 
complementary partner.  
The team thought of Egypt to be a reasonable market choice since it had one of the largest 
populations in North Africa and the Middle East, and was a basis for covering all African 
countries.  
ISA started establishing contacts with the Arab Portuguese Chamber of Commerce. The 
institution, which mission was to support and develop commercial and cultural relationships 
between Portugal and the 22 member countries of the league of the Arab States, was the main 
vehicle to find a partner.  
An interesting opportunity was to create a joint venture with Wahid Tawfik, a well-known 
Arabian business man whom the ISA managers already knew from his former successful 
experience at the DuPont Group, and who was interested in the Portuguese company as a way 
to reach the Brazilian market. Wahid Tawfik was the CEO of Calensia, a consulting firm focused 
on business and operational development and investment advice which was already working 
                                                          
4
 In 2011, Turkey’s GDP growth rate was of 8,8%. Source: World Bank 
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with key markets for ISA, such as fuel distribution, telecommunications and agricultural 
production farms businesses. Henrique’s team saw that the partner had good technical 
solutions and an extensive networking that ISA could benefit from - they could aggregate their 
complementary strengths in terms of business and value chain.  
The main goal of the Joint Venture was to create local synergies which would allow the alliance 
to reach all the countries of the Persian Gulf and the Arab World. However, it did not take a 
long time for ISA to realize that it would be as impossible as “covering the USA through a joint 
venture established in México”. Cultural differences and political barriers would be hard to 
surpass. Thus, after being established in Cairo for a few months and having some interesting 
partnership opportunities on their hands, Henrique and Wahid Tawfik considered the 
possibility of focusing the Egyptian joint venture on North Africa and to approach directly the 
Middle East from Portugal, for the market characteristics were highly differentiated between 
these regions. Therefore, in the first quarter of 2012, Wahid Tawfik took the chair of managing 
director of ISA Middle East. 
Although the Arabic countries still had technical gaps, Henrique saw them as an opportunity to 
sell knowledge and services. The Portuguese team for the Middle East market, led by 
Henrique, saw a traditional but saturated market of oil and gas as a threat to its business, and 
consequently decided to offer energy efficiency solutions, to which potential clients were 
becoming increasingly responsive. In addition, Henrique claimed the market to be poorly 
exploited in terms of energy and hydric telemetry, which could lead to the increasing adoption 
of solutions which fit with ISA’s offer. Moreover, it was important for the firm to enjoy the 
ease of acceptance Portugal had in their commercial relationships for its war conflict free past 
with Arab countries, and the geographical proximity advantage.  
2.7. Local Presence and International Sales Process 
During that meeting Henrique also wondered about which of ISA’s employees he could suggest 
to execute the projects soon to be implemented, and who was prepared to face such a cultural 
impact while representing the company. In spite of having a strong team on the headquarters, 
ten employees were already sent to work in Cairo, to work closely on the projects. 
The sales procedure always began by establishing B2B projects through the local partners’ 
network, and therefore enhancing the importance of the relationship with his partners as a 
way to reach clients. Henrique was explaining how the need for a direct contact facilitated the 
initial process complementing their market segmentation for water and energetic efficiency, 
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which was mainly focused on Banking, Shopping Centers, Facility Management, Retail Stores, 
and Public Administration. The next step was to find opportunities that fit in ISA’s offer 
through searching for gaps in the firms’ value chain. As solutions were tailored to each client’s 
needs, Henrique knew that project prices could vary between 50.000€ and 1.000.000€. The 
main difference between geographies ended up being the cost of imports for the equipment, 
which weighed more in Brazil.  
Later on, the sales team discussed about a logical solution within the existent constraints, and 
finally reached a commercial proposal for providing the solution. This was negotiated with the 
client, with the aim of finding a point of approval in order to turn it into a real project. From 
this point on, ISA’s representative in the country monitored the project execution and 
provided customer support along with the local partner, reporting relevant information 
directly to Henrique. 
After rendering a successful project, ISA used it as a reference to begin new ones within the 
same market. 
2.8. Magnifying ISA 
As an internationalized company, ISA’s decisions on entering new markets were not always 
crystal clear. There were, along the way, some tough decisions had to make without knowing 
what was at the end of the road. The company’s attempt to enter the United States’ market 
had been one of them. ISA had an approaching strategy that didn’t pay off and had to quit. In 
2010, the main reason was the regulatory barrier to the entry of new products in the market, 
which entailed specific certifications and modifications, and a lack of guidelines on the best 
way to do it. The fierce competition in the country was also threatening but Henrique was 
mainly concerned with whether they would be able to develop a product that could be 
commercialized in the USA in the foreseeable future.  
But Henrique thought that sometimes numbers say gold, while reasoning says no. Angola for 
example, a market where many Portuguese companies were doing business, was not attractive 
for ISA for strategic reasons. “We are not in the business of giving money away in order to 
develop our business”– said Henrique. “It’s a country where everything only moves under 
bribery, which allied to an overcrowded market and the security problem, turns it into a very 
unattractive market for Portuguese firms.” ISA’s strategic thinking always avoided going into 
markets which could obviously be dangerous for its business, such as Nigeria. Henrique 
explained that “it is crucial to understand a market; not even doing business in Brazil is clear-
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cut. And when you go to the Arab world this factor of difficulty multiplies by 10 or 100 due to 
cultural discrepancy.” In these countries, business develops much slower, as the Arab speaks in 
the eyes and the relationship takes such a big role.  
However, what seems to be cross-cutting and a must for every country is a good support 
system both in Portugal and at the local market, a well-conceived realistic plan and, last but 
not the least, an appropriate investment on a considerably long timeline. According to 
Henrique, the reason for the long timeline lied on the fact that “Portuguese companies are 
never going to be a dominant player in the international market, as Portugal does not have a 
very strong internal market”. The difficulty of most companies in the Middle East, he 
explained, was that they only make 6-month investments. After that semester, they realize 
that it was a very short time to develop the necessary commercial relationship and had already 
spent their available capital, forcing them to leave the market. 
2.9. NYSE Alternext 
The international image of the firm had improved in the last years. Since Henrique entered the 
firm, all employees and managers worked together to understand what had to be fine-tuned, 
aligning their internal departments to move forward.  
As so, in June 2012, they were able to reach the milestone they have been working on for the 
last years. ISA was the first Portuguese company to be admitted at the NYSE Alternext, the 
equity trading market for small to medium sized companies. On Henrique’s perspective, there 
were three main reasons why this was so desirable: 
Firstly, for a matter of internal standards. A listed company has far more obligations of 
strictness and discipline, which meant additional quality for the whole firm. 
Secondly, for the image it conveyed to the market, a credibility measure for showing up with a 
particular background. It was a differentiation factor that eased the approach to the market, 
showing the barriers they crossed over to reach this target. The administration desire was for 
this to work as an international certification. 
Thirdly, as for most companies, for financial issues. The shareholder structure had been 
modified 2 years before and was still very stable. Nevertheless, the administration was being 
cautious and forearming future investments on new markets. Adding up to the possible need 
of new investors, the existence of a far more transparent and visible operation was very 
important for trust issues.  
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However, not everything was bright. Being on display for the whole world to see was a two 
way street. When something went wrong, the firm was injured. Moreover, for competitive 
issues, competitors had access to ISA’s data and strategic plans that they did not have 
previously. 
2.10. The Unforeseen 
However, in July 2012, the game turned against the company. Looking back, Henrique saw a 
difficult market that has been slowly opening to ISA since the first fuel tanks solution being 
installed in Egypt5, reaching a time of elections. For the first semester of 2012, its entrance in 
the market had actually exceeded its expectations. The pilot tests were successful and the 
team, which included two Portuguese engineers of ISA and six Egyptians, was also establishing 
new contracts.  
The instability lived in all the North African and Middle Eastern countries since the Arab 
Spring6, were mainly due to the attempt to overthrow the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. 
Millions of protesters participated in the Egyptian Revolution in 2011. President Murabak 
stepped down in February 2011 and the Air Force’s chief, Ahmed Shafik, assumed the 
government’s chair. At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood7, an Islamic organization of 
great influence in Egypt, became legal and founded the Freedom and Justice Party which was 
led by Mohammed Morsi.  
In July 2012, Mohammed Morsi was the first president being democratically elected in Egypt 
beating Ahmed Shafiq with 51% of the votes8. At the inaugural ceremony, Morsi stated "Today 
we start a new chapter in the history of Egypt. We turn an old page of an ugly era."  
To ISA’s concern, the straight division of the country between Islamist governance and the 
moderate Muslims, Christians and liberals could only trigger a civil war.  
2.11. Next Steps 
On the day after the meeting, Henrique was going to fly back to Egypt. ISA continued having a 
special relationship with the Arab World. For the last year, he had been spending most of his 
                                                          
5
 ISA installs its first equipment in the Middle East – (artigo) 
6
  Korotayev A., Zinkina J., (2011) 
7
 “What is the Muslim Brotherhood?”, CNN, June 25, 2012 
8
 “New President: Egypt turns page to new era”, CNN, June 30, 2012  
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time between Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in order to develop his local relationships as he 
knew that it was essential to continue meeting with his partners who already trusted him.  
Henrique stood up from his chair, and did a circle around North Africa and the Middle East. He 
knew that at this point these markets were very important for ISA and he could not dismiss 
them.  
The future could become dangerous to a joint venture which had recently entered the market 
and now was facing political and economic insecurity. The anxiety on this matter spread not 
only within the members of ISA Middle East but also between shareholders, who were soon 
requesting ISA to take action. Moreover, potential clients were not ready to invest in new 
contracts as the instability in Egypt would certainly reduce foreign investment and affect the 
whole economy for an undefined period of time.  As for now, the population was living a 
nightmare. One for which they could not afford to think further than assuring their own 
survival.  
Before flying back to Cairo, Henrique knocked on the office door of the CEO, José Basílio 
Simões, to discuss the outputs of the meeting. He had several options on his mind, and none of 
them seemed the perfect choice.   
After talking for a few hours, the CEO stressed out the importance of this decision for the 
company’s future and how reluctant on the future of the Persian Golf he was. The region was 
undoubtedly promising but the social and economic conflicts were constraining all business 
activities.  
The CEO was going to meet with the board during the next days and it would be on their hands 
to decide whether it made sense for ISA to divest in the North African and the Middle East 
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Exhibit 1 | Group Structure in 2012 
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Exhibit 2 | Internal Structure 
Source: ISA, Annual Report 2011 
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Investment 2011 (CapEx) 
Facilities improvement Basic Equipment Subsidiaries R&D
Exhibit 3 | ISA’s representation of a Smart City 
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Exhibit 4 | Investment in 2011 
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*The atypical growth of turnover in Portugal from 2010 to 2011, given the company’s history, was “mainly justified 




Exhibit 7 | Main Clients in the Portuguese Market 






III | Literature Review 
The main goal of this chapter is to review theoretical frameworks concerning the case study.  
Consequently, this section encompasses four main issues: Innovation and TR&D, International 
Negotiation, Entry Modes and Sustainability.  
It is important to notice that the information presented in this section mostly concerns the 
perspective of technological Small to Medium Enterprises (SMEs) when applying an 
internationalization strategy, focusing on the challenges these have to surpass in the 
achievement of success.  
3.1. R&D and Innovation in IJVs 
3.1.1. Innovation as a Competitive Advantage 
In 1942 Schumpeter defined innovation as the concretization of original ideas for products and 
processes differentiating it from invention, which in its turn was the action prior to innovation, 
the creation of these ideas and processes. Innovation can take the form of new inventions or 
the form of more effective means of organization and production which improve the 
traditional logistics (Ayyagari et al., 2011). The last form is commonly seen in emerging 
countries where processes which are already in use in developed countries are adjusted and 
applied to the reality of these economies.  
From a strictly rational point of view, innovation generates unique organizational competences 
that lead to competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Zollo and 
Winter, 2002 as mentioned by Hall and Martin, 2005). However, some authors argue that 
when the intensity of competition increases, a firm’s freedom to deviate from its competitors 
by applying innovative processes might decrease as that might not be well understood by their 
customers and therefore incur in unexpected costs whenever these actions fail (Ayyagari et al., 
2011). Moreover, this increasing competition might increase the innovation in incumbent firms 
which are technologically advanced and decrease its growth for the less efficient ones (Aghion 
et al. 2009, as mentioned by Ayyagari et al., 2011).  
There is common ground in literature on the importance that innovative responses to changing 
economic environments have on economic development. In developing countries, SMEs are 
considered to be the main contributors of innovation. However, in their study, Ayyagari et al. 
shown that generally the most innovative firms tend to be the larger and younger ones, with 
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highly educated managers which have some managerial experience and where the exporting 
activity and private ownership also show to be relevant. The ones with more access to external 
financing, the ones competing internationally and the firms which borrow in foreign currency 
indicate higher levels of innovation. On the other hand, state-owned firms showed to be the 
least innovative, cetaris paribus. The exposure to foreign markets’ competition forces both 
MNEs and SMEs to innovate in order to survive to changing environments mainly in countries 
where governance is ineffective.  
3.1.2. Disruptive and Sustaining Technologies 
Disruptive technologies can be defined as the technologies that break through the traditional 
market capabilities and generate a new competitive environment (Kassicieh et al., 2002). On 
the other hand, sustaining technologies improve the already established practices and add 
value to the value chain (Kassicieh et al., 2002).  
Figure 1 - Disruptive technology innovation model
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Clayton M. Christensen, the pioneer of this view, stated that as disruptive technologies have 
different attributes from market products, these may not be valued by its existing customers 
and therefore have higher risk for their resistance. Moreover, Freeman (1982) categorized 
innovation uncertainty concerning four fields: technological feasibility, commercial viability, 
organizational capability and social acceptability (Hall and Martin, 2005). Consequently, this 
reinforces the need for strategic flexibility, by pulling and pushing discontinuous developments 
in a firm’s environment and building dynamic capabilities to better use their resources in order 
to answer the needs of changing markets (Walsh & Kirchhoff, 2002).  
                                                          
9
 Source: Walsh & Kirchhoff , 2002 
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As we can see in the above scheme (Figure 1), new technologies might come from the inside of 
the industry, originated by the core competencies of a firm. These are intended as the 
knowledge and capabilities underlying a firm’s activity and that provide a competitive 
advantage to the firm (Prahalad and Hammel 1991, as quoted by Walsh, 2002). Although this 
source tends to create only evolutionary technology, R&D efforts within the firm can also 
create radical technologies.  
When technologies are originated exogenously, they break through the existing industry and 
create new markets for their products, as it is risky to compete against existing technology that 
is already familiar to the consumer. These technologies create discontinuous innovation as 
they are a product of disruptive inventions, which are harder to commercialize due to the risk 
of newness: It is difficult but mandatory that consumers create new habits to take all the 
benefits of the technology and that can be done through proving (mainly to lead user groups), 
that they perform better and are less costly (Walsh & Kirchhoff, 2002) 
Regardless of their difficult commercialization, disruptive innovations are protected by 
intellectual property which leads to competitive advantage and sustainability until its patent 
duration ends and, at that time, the disruptive technology will have turned into evolutionary as 
it is already familiar to consumers (Bower and Christensen, 1995).  
 In what concerns the flow of the evolutionary technology, it produces continuous innovations 
as an improvement of established processes, in result of consumers’ behavioral change who 
demand better products (Walsh & Kirchhoff, 2002).  
The scheme suggests that the commercialization of technologies should be done in a different 
way, as they imply distinctive efforts to attract demand. There is also a difference between the 
goals of each of them. Firms that place their stakes on disruptive technologies are more 
concerned on their products’ success and on R&D support whilst the ones applying sustaining 
technologies focus on the existing market potential and on increasing their revenues 
(Kassicieh, 2002). As products resulting from the former are usually more practical and simpler, 
this can lead them to exceed what the market demands and ultimately to occupy the lower 
end of the traditional market (Christensen, 1997).  
In this line of thought, Stephen Walsh (2002) focus on Madiquis idea recognition model (1969) 
who differentiates two sources of innovation: recognizing technological feasibility, called 
“technological push” or recognizing potential demand for an invention, known as “market 
pull”, stating that both of them can lead to sustainable competitive advantage.   
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Walsh perceived a stream of profits deriving from the market pull view, where the loyalty and 
dependence of a consumer is superior due to continuous innovations built on existing 
technologies which in their turn are the outcome of long-term R&D efforts.  
On the other hand, building on Bower and Christensen (1995) perspective, Walsh reinforces 
the risk of commercializing disruptive technologies for the resistance to change which might 
affect the technological transfer. However, the inexistence of an established customer base 
can provide flexibility to new firms. The user application type of disruptive technologies based 
on a technological push strategy is stated to be, as Schumpeter (1942) emphasizes in his work, 
a result of “creative destruction”, as existing markets are eliminated or enlarged and new ones 
are created for the new technology, which he refers to as an important driver of economic 
progress and capitalism. Adding to Schumpeter’s work, “Innovation without creative 
destruction implies finding new markets and thus creating new consumer demand” (Burke et 
al 2009:21). 
Successful disruptive technologies are said to dethrone the industry leaders as incumbents do 
not know how to compete in an emerging field (Cooper and Smith, 1992 as quoted by 
Utterback, 2005). Utterback (2005: 5) states that “the change from one technological paradigm 
that has shaped a firm to a new paradigm formed by economic and social change presents a 
significant challenge for incumbent firms”.  
Christensen alleges that establishing new market segments is a means of delivering the new 
technology to early adopters and that once this innovation reaches most users it begins to 
compete with the older products of the traditional market (Christensen 1997, as quoted by 
Utterback 2005). 
Moreover, Christensen (1995) claims that investments in disruptive technologies by 
established firms would not bring benefits as the existing customer base would not be able to 
use them, these technologies offer lower margins and these firms are not acting on an 
emerging market. As so, he states that firms willing to create disruptive growth should attempt 
to win the layer of non-consumers as it is much easier than stealing from competition.   
3.1.3. Innovation & Stakeholders 
It is also important to enhance the relationship between innovative companies and its 
stakeholders. For this purpose, Donaldson and Preston (1995) distinguished the role of a firm’s 
stakeholders for their importance and involvement with the firm. In their literature, they have 
considered the normative approach to be the one concerning corporate stakeholders, to which 
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the firm has a moral obligation and direct involvement (Philips et al., 2003), such as the firm’s 
employees, investors, customers, suppliers, financiers and local communities. On the other 
hand, instrumental (Donaldson and Preston 1995) shareholders are viewed as the ones to 
which the firm has no moral obligation (Philips et al. 2003) but should also be managed as they 
can affect the firm in a positive or negative way. This group which among others includes the 
media, activists and competitors, can enhance a firm’s competitive advantage if the firm is able 
to establish trustful relationships (Hall and Martin, 2005).  
In this line of thought, identifying which stakeholders present higher power of influence, 
higher legitimacy among the society and higher urgency degree, is seen as a primordial issue in 
the design of innovative solutions mainly for the ethical issues at stake (Mitchell et al., 1997 as 
mentioned by Hall and Martin 2005).  
According to Hall and Martin (2005: 276), “a key challenge in radical technology development 
is the ability to accommodate such pressures (…), to exploit the potential benefits as well as 
assess, manage and minimize the perceived or unforeseen unintended negative consequences 
of the technology”.  
Consequently, the authors conclude that social feasibility represents another barrier to 
overcome in the path of developing successful disruptive technologies. 
 
“The key to innovative success is to minimize the disruption within the innovation value-added 
chain”10  
 
3.1.4. The Contribution of Technological R&D for Innovation in 
SMEs 
Innovative SMEs who invest in improving their R&D competences are more propitious to 
develop technological alliances and the required cooperation to acquire external resources 
which will bring them to a high standard, leveling them up to compete on the level of big 
companies. Audretsch and Vivarelli, 1996, as quoted by Barajas, Huergo and Moreno, 2012). 
The firms’ dimension is not the only variable that determines its impact on possible 
technological alliances. A R&D unit previously running inside the firm, the knowledge of the 
                                                          
10
 Source: Hall and Martin, 2005: 274 
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R&D personnel, the number of patents and the previous experience in partnerships are also 
positive influencers of a firm’s success. Furthermore, the decision to make a technological R&D 
alliance derives from “a combination of internal capacity and external needs”. (Barajas et al., 
2012:5).  
 “Following the resource-based theory, cooperative and in-house R&D activities are considered 
complementary strategies aiming to increase technological capacities of firms.” (Barajas, et al., 
2012: 5). In conclusion, “economic performance seems to be more influenced by the type of 
technological partner, the distance to the market of the cooperative project and the type of 
firm” (Colombo et al.,2009). 
3.1.5. The innovation value curve 
The value curve is a very common tool used across all types of companies. It represents the 
level at which a firm operates on all the characteristics of the industry that are valued by its 
customers and draws the position of its competitors on the same characteristics, allowing a 
comparison.  
In its turn, the innovation value curve brings new ground for determining which of the existing 
value drivers need to be repositioned or even dropped and whether some new value drivers 
should be introduced in order to determine a firm’s optimal positioning (Narasimhalu, 2007). 
The importance of each value driver will depend on the cost sensitivity of consumers on that 
specific matter. As “an innovation is only as good as the value it creates for the customer” 
(Narasimhalu, 2007: 556), it is important to balance the effective cost of a innovation by 
upgrading the most valued drivers and downgrading the least valued ones.  
For this matter, two methods are proposed by the author: To begin by placing all available 
funds on the most preferable drivers until they reach the desired level by consumers and 
continue down the scale, and if two or more have the same importance, to begin where the 
unit upgrade cost is lower or to place an equal amount of funds to each valued characteristic 
and therefore, to upgrade them equally.   
3.1.6. Business Intelligence Processes 
In the complex world of data gathering, Business Intelligence (BI) aroused as a solution for 
treating the collected information and for making it useful for decision making processes. This 




onments and having information about it on your hands brings easiness to apply realistic 
tactics and strategies. The success of these processes mainly depends on the reliability of the 
collected data as well as the way it is converted into important information. For increasing the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of the companies’ logistics, knowledge and resources, BI has 
the potential of increasing firms competiveness (Zeng et all. 2006). 
Figure 2 - Generic Business Intelligence Framework
11 
For understanding how Business Intelligence works in practice, it is important to know the 
different stages and succeed in all of them. The first step is acquiring data, which can be done 
through observing consumers behavior and preferences, the supply chain and the streams of 
information across the organization through integrated systems such as Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM), Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and Supply Chain Management 
(SCM). Afterwards, this complex information is stored on the Data Warehouse, and analyzed 
by on-line analytical processing (OLAP) techniques. After the information is organized, the next 
process is known as Data Mining, the identification of patterns which will help solving specific 
business problems through predictions, clustering and estimations.  
These platforms support companies with easy-to-use applications across all employees, 
providing them important tools to understand customers and markets leading all the 
organization to make better decisions and therefore, leading to higher competitiveness. For 
this purpose, it is crucial to understand that all of these processes should be undertaken, as 
investing efforts in the first stages without deploying the analyzed data won’t bring the 
ultimate expected results (Zeng et al., 2006). “The business value of BI lies in its use within 
management processes that impact operational processes that drive revenue or reduce costs, 
and/or in its use within those operational processes themselves” (Williams and Williams, 2003: 
3). As so, to create value through BI, the firm should be strategically aligned and the business 
questions that require an answer should be clear, so that BI can deliver value by anticipating 
future changes and needs.  (Williams and William, 2003).  
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 Source: Zeng et all. 2006: 4722 
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3.2. International Negotiation 
Gerard Hendrik Hofstede once said that "Culture is more often a source of conflict than of 
synergy. Cultural differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster." For as long as the 
human being has its roots, globalization cannot overcome the impact of managing style and 
strategic behavior as related to one’s cultural background (Dimitratos et al., 2011).  
Thus, it is important to realize how culture affects strategic management decision-making 
processes (SMDP) in an international context in order to avoid ineffective strategic moves in 
business relations (Tse, Lee, Vertinsky, Wehrun 1988, as quoted by P. Dimitratos et al. 2011)  
SMDP involves steps and tactics that go from the identification of stimulus for action and end 
with its commitment. It is therefore crucial for the success of long-term performance and the 
achievement of competitive advantage which require reconfiguration of resources and 
competencies within the firm (Dimitratos et al. 2011). 
Based on the approach of Dimitratos et al. (2011), a relationship between Hofstede cultural 
dimensions and three dimensions of SDMP is shown here: 
 Hierarchical decentralization, which refers to the extent of authority and power across 
firms in the SMDP; 
 Later communication, which examines the contribution to the SMDP of each business 
unit and department and the internal communication effectiveness; 
 Formalization, concerns the extent to which organizational policies and plans are 
integrated in the SMDP  
3.2.1. Hofstede dimensions 
On his extensive research in forty countries, Hofstede (1980) considered that the four main 
dimensions of distinctiveness in cultural background that impact international negotiation 
concerned power distance, individualism vs collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity vs femininity, as can be seen in Figure 3. However, in 1988, Hofstede and Bond 
developed a new element due to the discovery of specificities in Asian countries: the long-term 




Figure 3 - Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions Theory
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The first dimension, power distance, refers to the degree of acceptance and expectation of a 
hierarchical order within firms. The higher this element scores, the more is the inequality in 
power distribution.  
Uncertainty avoidance concerns the extent to which individuals in a country deal and tolerate 
risk and the unknown. A country with high score on this matter will be a sign of strict rules and 
laws implemented to avert uncertainty.  
In its turn, individualism relates to the lack of concern of one person with others. Working as a 
group and celebrating achievements with others is a characteristic of collectivist cultures.  
The fourth dimension, masculinity, concerns the degree of gender differentiation and 
therefore has a high impact on women’ rights in the society and on their careers. A society 
where women have no decision power and have unequal opportunities would imply a high 
masculinity degree.  
The fifth and most recent dimension, long or short-term differentiation, is mostly related to 
how societies face change. A high long-term differentiation indicates that the country is highly 
attached to traditions and values, has a strong work-ethic and prioritizes social obligations.  
Hofstede considers that power distance and uncertainty avoidance are the main dimensions as 
they can “influence the success of the SMDP by shaping expectations and commitment of 
organizational participants” (Dimitratos et al, 2011: 196). 
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 Source: Hofstede and Bond, 1988 
28 
 
As so, Dimitratos (2011) concluded in his research that high power distance in the 
international firm location has a negative relation with hierarchical decentralization for what 
concerns international SMDP of that firm. Furthermore, individualism was not found to be 
negatively related to lateral communication. Although individualistic cultures’ concern is focus 
on the self, these tend to pro-actively gather information and consequently use the 
information gathered in the SMDP. Ultimately, formalization in SMDP was found to be 
correlated with uncertainty avoidance as higher control levels are required in processes to 
preclude risks in these cultures.  
3.3. Entry Modes 
On a daily business work, companies face the need to make several decisions on their budget 
for marketing implementation, on the launching of new product lines, on their human capital 
needs, etc.. Nevertheless, when it comes to planning for future long-term outcomes, there are 
some decisions that portray higher responsibility and one of them is the decision of entering 
new markets. The reasons underlying the decision of entering new markets are usually related 
to an attempt of minimizing the risk by diversifying the geography where the firm works, or 
increasing sales and production volume (economies of scale) in non-saturated markets where 
the company sees an opportunity to succeed (Arnold, 2003).   
For deciding on the path to “go global”, there is not a singular way that fits every company. On 
the contrary, firms should decide on the basis of the transaction cost theory (Brouthers and 
Nakos, 2004) which can lead them to the following decisions: 
- Direct or Indirect Exporting 
- Franchising,  
- Licensing,  
- Joint-venturing,  
- Management contracting  
- Contract manufacturing 
-  Wholly-owned overseas subsidiaries 
- Green-field investment: 100% owned subsidiary, creating a new entity 
- Full Acquisition: Acquiring 100% of a local firm 
- Partially-owned overseas subsidiaries 
- Partial Acquisition 
- Joint Venture 
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The transaction cost theory has been widely used across different literature of 
internationalization, as a tool to determine the entry mode choice. This theory concerns three 
variables from which both MNEs and SMEs can take valuable conclusions. The first one, Asset 
Specificity, is related “to the physical and human resources, which may lose value in another 
use, that a company employs to complete a specific task” (Brouthers and Nakos, 2004:3). For 
example, when the expertise of a technician is high, the danger of losing it to competition and 
replacing it is higher. Secondly, firms are required to safeguard themselves from possible 
opportunistic behaviors of the foreign firms through the use of legal control tools and learning 
experience. This type of threat has the name of Behavioral Uncertainty. Lastly, the hostility of 
the market and its political risk cause Environmental Uncertainty to the new entrant. 
(Brouthers and Nakos, 2004).  
 
Research has proven that equity modes of entry are preferred not only by SMES that make 
larger asset-specific investments but also by the ones perceiving lower environmental 
uncertainties in the target market and by the ones with advanced internal control, for a matter 
of risk and internal control (Brouthers and Nakos, 2004).  
 
3.3.1. Strategic Alliances 
"Few companies have everything that they need. You may need money, customers, or 
product. No matter what you need, there is someone who has it. That someone is a potential 
Corporate Partner." - Curtis E. Sahakian 
Strategic Alliances are partnerships in which two or more firms join their efforts and 
complement each other in order to achieve what would be impossible or less profitable 
without a partner. The imperative duration, the quantity of required resources and the degree 
of autonomy within the alliance vary according to each case, therefore creating different types 
of alliances which can go from a simple collaboration, to a strategic partnership, the creation 
of a joint-venture or of a group structure until the merger of both companies which represents 
the higher degree of a strategic alliance (Yan, 1998; Hanvanich, 2003).  
However, it is highly important to weight the risks, knowledge and skills of the potential 
partner to assure its feasibility and profitability, as several problems may arise. Cultural 
differences, for example, “make an IJV more susceptible to termination than a wholly-owned 
subsidiary” (Hanvanich et al., 2003: 6).  
30 
 
3.3.2. International Joint Ventures 
A firm wants to form an International Joint Venture (IJV) only if expected benefits outbalance 
the additional costs of shared compromise, conflict, decision making and coordination of 
partners when they engage in this activity (Beamish & Banks, 1987, as quoted by Geringer 
1991).  
For this matter, Hanvanich et al. (2003), building on Makino & Beamish (1998) model classified 
five ownership structures of joint-ventures in their research: 
 Domestic JVs  
 Tri-national – home-country and third-country based firms; 
 Cross-national IJVs – unaffiliated home-country firms; 
 Home-country traditional IJVs – JV between home-country based and foreign-based 
firms located in the home country 
 Host-country traditional IJVs – JV between a home-country firm and a host-country 
firm, located in the host country 
3.3.2.1. The Case of SMEs vs MNEs 
What differentiate SMEs from large multinational enterprises (MNEs) are their managerial 
style, ownership, and independence (Brouthers and Nakos, 2004: 229). They represent smaller 
versions of MNEs that due to their dimension face the external environment and international 
strategic decisions through different options.  
Lu & Beamish (2006) state that when SMEs open subsidiaries in other countries they are 
confronted by three main liabilities: foreignness, newness and smallness. The choice of the 
right partner is a compelling way to overcome the three of them mainly if it is local. 
The authors explain that both MNEs and SMEs are confronted by the liabilities of foreignness 
and newness. The first implies the lack of local knowledge which undermines the firm’s 
competitive advantage facing local companies and the second represents the difficulties of 
new entrants as in financing and attracting stakeholders due to their lack of legitimacy in the 
new country contrarily to the recognized incumbents, a process that takes time and money to 
overcome. However, difficulties for SMEs entrance are enhanced due to the liability of 
smallness which also affects them, as small sized companies tend to create similar in-size 
subsidiaries, with limited resources and capabilities which make them “more vulnerable to 
environmental change” (Lu & Beamish, 2006:462). In this line of thought, the authors argue 
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that resources such as knowledge about the local markets, firm’s reputation and financial 
capital play are the major barriers that SMEs need to overcome when going overseas and 
consequently, the interesting search for the right partner arises.   
3.3.2.2. The right partner 
Partner selection is one of the first and most fundamental choices that a firm makes after 
deciding to use an IJV as an entry mode (Hitt et al., 1995 as quoted by Lu & Beamish, 2006).  
In research from the 80s and 90s, it has been discussed that a core factor for the success of 
IJVs was the choice of the partner, since the complementarity between both parent firms 
would be the main responsible for its effectiveness (Chowdhury, 1989 as quoted by Geringer, 
1991).  
More precisely, authors like Awadzi (1987), placed this choice on four selection criteria, which 
included complementarity of partner’s resource contributions (as mentioned above); past 
association between partners – if they have previously done business together; relatedness of 
partners’ businesses – what can I learn from his business that can be applied to mine?; and 
relatedness of foreign partners’ and IJVs’ businesses – Are both parent firms contributing with 
the same level of know-how and resources for the IJV business? (Geringer, 1991) 
There is extensive qualitative research on the most valuable characteristics a local partner 
must have, although most studies reveal lack of consistency in the results. However, the 
differences in firms’ dimension between partners’ plays a big role on what importance will be 
given to the IJV, their power position and bargaining motivations (Daniels, 1971 as quoted by 
Geringer, 1991).  
Geringer (1991) separates these criteria into two, the task-related criteria and the partner-
related criteria.  By task-related criteria the author refers to what happens inside the firm at an 
operational skills and resources’ level in spite of the partner’s and that is crucial for the IJV 
success. On the other hand, partner related criteria stands for the effectiveness of partner’s 
cooperation. For approaching this criteria, the use of Critical Success Factors (CSFs), which are 
crucial to the competitive advantage of a firm, build on firms’ industry characteristics (Porter, 
1980), have shown to be useful as determinants of the necessary needs for complementary 
between partners (Geringer, 1991). The author also claims that although this analysis is 
influenced by the firm perspectives, this internal perception is the one crucial for strategy 




 It is also pointed out that after the acknowledgement of the CSFs, these “should reflect the 
perceived relative importance to the firm of various contributions a partner can make toward 
improving competitive position and developing sustainable competitive advantage”(Geringer, 
1991: 47). As so, a firm seeks a partner whose strengths cover the basic needs of the venture 
that can’t be covered by the first parent (Davidson, 1982) and prioritize the importance of 
those needs. Moreover, this interdependency showed to be strongly related to the durability 
and performance of the IJVs (Geringer, 1991). 
3.3.2.3. Profitability and Longevity of SMEs IJVs  
Theories on the main influents of IJVs partners’ relationships have pointed out the complexity 
of differences between SMEs and MNEs due to the differences in legitimacy, public awareness, 
power and resources – liability of smallness. Furthermore, as the core management of SMEs is 
usually comprised by the founders which are not necessarily qualified personnel as in the case 
of MNEs, decisions are more centralized and made on a less rational/objective base, which 
might have a negative impact on the performance of both the firm and its subsidiary (Lu & 
Beamish, 2006). 
A host country partner might help mitigate the risk involved in getting the required knowledge 
by itself as if it was a wholly-owned subsidiary. Although possible, the learning- by-doing 
process is more exhausting and risky, representing a higher danger to the longevity of the 
subsidiary than accessing a local’s partner knowledge base (Beamish, 1999). 
Moreover, the local partner’s knowledge concerns distribution channels, networks as well as 
information about consumers, competitors and changes in the industry which can leverage the 
positioning of the IJV in the market which turns into higher profitability and reduced liability of 
foreignness. Later, when the SMEs becomes more familiar with the market due to the 
knowledge acquisition from the partner, the interdependency on the local partner decreases, 
increasing the foreign partner’s power of bargaining and may lead to the IJV’s instability or 
dissolution (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997 as quoted in Lu & Beamish, 2006).  
 Although the bargaining power of each partner of the IJV is undoubtedly an important issue in 
what concerns its longevity, a large-sized partner can bring several advantages to the SMEs 
strategy. Reputation and resources would cover the SMEs liabilities as a new entrant, giving it 
the opportunity to grow and operate faster as well as of accumulating valuable resources and 
consequently to become less vulnerable (Lu & Beamish, 2006). As firms’ legitimacy is often 
associated to its size as a result of prior accomplishments, the leverage the partner will bring 
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on the IJVs reputation by its endorsement effect will conquer the institutional environment of 
the relevant industries (Lu & Beamish, 2006). The authors discovered that it is much easier to 
acquire the partner’s local knowledge than its size-related resources. As for other resources, 
the more difficult it is for the other partner to replicate them, the longer is the probability for 
the IJV to remain stable.  
Furthermore, other advantages rely on the larger-sized partner having “deep pockets” which 
can better sustain eventual losses, a longer-term view of its investments and a deeper concern 
on the impact that a subsidiaries’ dissolution would have on its reputation, factors which can 
extend the IJVs longevity (Lu & Beamish, 2006). The more they need to learn from each other, 
the longer will the IJV hold stable as the bargaining power of each partner will become more 
levelheaded (Lu & Beamish, 2006).  
3.3.2.4. Predatory Alliances 
One concern on SMEs alliances with larger partners is associated with the higher bargaining 
power of the larger partner as the smaller requires its knowledge and resources (Lu & 
Beamish, 2006). This may lead to a situation where the larger partners might “exploit the 
international joint ventures or alliances for their own economic gains” (Lu & Beamish, 2006: 
470). The exploitation might be in the form of driving activities to benefit its own products and 
services in spite of the IJVs primarily purpose, decreasing the IJVs profitability. One solution for 
this problem is to increase the level of equity ownership of the larger partner in order to 
decrease the exploitation, as it will be more concerned about the future of the IJV (Lu & 
Beamish, 2006).  
 
3.3.2.5. Knowledge Management within the IJV 
This subject intends to enhance the importance of knowledge flows during the period of 
activity of IJVs as knowledge acquisition is the underlying goal of any partnership for having 
shared risk with doubled knowledge resources (Berdrow and Lane, 2003). These authors 
considered the existence of three types of flows in IJVs:  
 Knowledge Transfer, implying the transmission of know-how from one partner to the 
other and to the IJV; 
 Knowledge Transformation, defined as “the integration, application and leverage of 
contributed knowledge and the creation of new knowledge as a result of the joint 
activities” (Berdrow and Lane, 2003: 18)  
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 Knowledge Harvesting entails the flow of knowledge produced by the IJV that comes 
back as an experience to the partners and can be externally replicated.  
These flows are part of firm-specific knowledge (internal) and market-specific knowledge 
acquisition (external) which allow and require a firm to also develop resource-integration and 
partnering knowledge through the alliance and therefore, to  reach its objectives in new 
market settings.  Berdrow and Lane (2003), considered a set of attributes to be crucial for the 
successful knowledge acquisition and which are represented in the table below: 




Managing knowledge resources leads to enhanced adaptability and responsiveness for the IJV 
and long term strategic benefits for the parent firms. Moreover, through a learning culture, 
resource contributions may maximize learning outcomes instead of minimizing the cost 
structure, in order to create value (Berdrow and Lane, 2003).  
3.3.2.6. Hofstede dimensions as IJVs performance influencers 
Cultural differences in JVs can lead to instability and bad performance (Yang and Zen, 1999 as 
quoted by Hanvanich et al, 2003) as well as to impairments on information flow and mistrust 
(Buckley & Casson, 1996, as quoted by Hanvanich et al, 2003). 
                                                          
13
 The authors indicate a liaison person as an intermediary only responsible for the control of the stability of the IJV. 
As partner’s still have their own firms, a liaison person can be impartially assuring the maintenance of trust and 
respect between parts (Source: Berdrow and Lane, 2003) 
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Partners with similar cultures should experience higher survival rates and performance levels 
as this similarity diminishes the probability of different management styles and knowledge 
management practices, avoiding mistrust and ambiguities in the relationship (Hanvanich et al, 
2003). Figure 514 indicates the main reasons that lead to stability or instability in a IJV.  
The double-layered acculturation is stated as the case in which “there are both partner and 
location differences”, meaning that firms have to overcome differences “from the host country 
national culture and partner’s culture differences (…) and therefore leading to higher relational 
hazards (trust building costs)” (Barkema et al., 1996 as quoted by Hanvanich et al., 2003: 6). 
This situation happens when the IJV is structured as an host-country traditional IJV, in which 
case it is less probable to expect cooperative behavior than when the JV is neutral for both 
partners (third-country IJV) (Hanvanich et al., 2003).  
3.4. Market Divestment of IJVs in Emerging Economies 
The presence of a firm in a foreign country through strategic alliances may not have the 
expected results that were primarily ambitioned. Although partners are the main contributors 
for IJV stability, there are other reasons that might come in the way of its success. Therefore, 
divestment15 refers to the sale of assets or subsidiaries which are no longer providing 
sustainable profits, in order to “improve a company’s capital position and to provide a more 
                                                          
14
 Source: Yan, 1998: 788 
15
 Divestment is referred to as divestiture 
Figure 5 - A framework of structural reconfiguration in IJVs 
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efficient, cleaner and transparent structure that adds value for shareholders”16. This strategy 
might take the form of the sale of a portion of the firm’s assets, such as a subsidiary, to 
raise capital or to focus the business on a smaller core of goods and services (Thompson, 
2005). 
Underlying the reasons for divestment, the most common is the low performance of the 
subsidiary, although one can find that the subsidiary not being vital for the core business of the 
firm or being of higher worth as a separate entity than as part of the company may also lead to 
the divestment. 
Research made to MNEs which have divested in the last years, indicate that market change 
was the lower chosen reason (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 - Primary reasons for carrying out a divestment
17
 
However, when the divestment concerns an IJV located in emerging countries this item 
becomes vital. Given the circumstances of emerging markets, usually attractive for their fast 
economic growth, “market structures are the products of idiosyncratic historical, political, 
legal, economic and cultural forces within any country” (Khanna & Palepu, 2010) 
“The opening of these large economies to global capital, technology, and talent over the past two 
decades has fundamentally changed their economic and business environments. As a result, the GDP 
growth rates of these countries have dramatically outpaced those of more developed economies, lifting 
millions out of poverty and creating new middle classes–and vast new markets for consumer products 
and services. Large, low-cost and increasingly educated labor pools, meanwhile, give these markets 
tremendous competitive advantage in production, and information technology is enabling companies to 
exploit labor in these markets in unique ways.” 
                                                          
16
 Source: “Is breaking up hard to do?” Deloitte Divestment Survey 2012 
17
 Source: “Is breaking up hard to do?” Deloitte Divestment Survey 2012 
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Even if these economies might seem extremely attractive, they hold a wide series of indicators 
that reveal an underdeveloped economy. These include facts such as unsteady intellectual 
propriety rights, government bureaucracy or corruption and poor local human capital. I will 
therefore focus on Government Corruption as one of the external reasons that affect the 
willingness to divest in an emerging economy.  
3.4.1. Governments Corruption 
According to Meschi (2007), the environment in which a firm acts plays a huge role in its future 
success. Whenever the firm finds itself in a completely different political and economic 
framework, the need for decision making on how to deal with this uncertainty that could 
threaten the firm’s existence is crucial. Government corruption may undermine the firm’s 
profits, the host’s country propriety rights, financial stability and economic growth.  
However, in emerging economies, some foreign firms might see the leverage on corruption as 
an opportunity for influencing the government for their own profit and of surpassing the 
liability of foreignness.  





3.5.1. The importance of Sustaining Competitive Advantages in 
Managing the Alliance’s Development 
Whenever a strategic alliance has taken off from its original goals, it is preponderant that both 
partners are aware of the path they have to lead in order to achieve success. However, 
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 Source: Transparency International  
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according to Hoffman and Schlosser (2001), this path requires compatibility between strategic 
planning between partners and suitable governance mechanisms which are able to guide the 
alliance through what has been planned in its early days. But is there any ground rule to 
achieve success?  
As any other firm, the ones involved in strategic partnerships are required to outperform 
among their competitors along their activity to sustain the firm’s survival, what is mainly 
difficult in instable environments such as the ones in developing countries (Yan, 1998). IJVs are 
themselves, a way that parent firms found to sustain their primary competitive advantages. 
Nevertheless, it is important to seek how sustainable is this form and what other sustaining 
competitive advantages should be built from then on. Following this perspective, management 
control of IJVs, the mechanisms to support it, the focus and extent to which it is applied, reveal 
to be essential (Le, 2009). Regarding control mechanisms, either being formal, such as rules 
and procedures, or social, such as interpersonal relations and a common organizational culture 
are crucial for the parent firms’ to create a common base of management and avoid 
opportunisms from one of the parents. 
Control focus, on the other hand, is a perspective concerned with the activities and 
departments where the firm founds its competitive advantage, where it has the most 
developed competencies and major goals, and therefore, the ones more relevant to prioritize. 
This includes, for example, the frequency of reports, the strictness with punctuality and the 
employee’s training intensity. 
 Furthermore, knowledge from and of the local partner has a great importance not only when 
entering a new market, but also in achieving competitive advantages in IJVs (Le, 2009). The 
transfer of knowledge, operational and formation training represent main tools of a successful 
relationship, as explained by the Organizational Learning Perspective (Child & Yan, 2003). 
However, in his study, Le (2009) adds another variable, the Resource Dependence Theory 
(RDT) developed by Peteraf in 1993. Firms vary in their resources and skills, and therefore 
depend on each other to surpass the lack of imperative resources and achieve competitive 
advantages (Le, 2009) .The balance between the amount and usefulness of the resources 
introduced by each of the parent firms’ states the power and control each of them has and 
therefore reduces uncertainty.  As Le (2009: 6) concluded, “foreign parent firms need to 
narrow down and loosen their control to some key areas of IJV operations such as human 
resources control, effective communication control”. Furthermore, depending on the 













required. For example, gaining market share in the foreign country and learning new skills 
would demand formal control structures and mechanisms to ensure they will meet the initial 
plans for the firm. On the other hand, the acquisition of skills and knowledge from the local 
















Lyles and Salk (1996) found that IJVs with equally shared ownership control had significantly 
higher levels of knowledge acquisition than majority controlled IJVs. Social control promotes 
inter-organizational learning by enhancing partner’s trust. 
 
3.5.2. Blue and Red Ocean Strategies 
 “To win in the future, companies must stop competing with each 
other. The only way to beat the competition is to stop trying to beat the 
competition” Kim & Mauborgne, 2005 
Kim and Mauborgne used the term ‘blue ocean’ for the first time in 2005 to define the strategy 
where firms stop striving in competitive environments by creating new markets and new 
demand which leads them to beat the competition in unexpected and successful ways. In their 
studies, they considered the market dynamics that point out strategic positioning as the 
decisions firms take on in order to succeed in the hard competitive markets their industry 
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 Source: Author 
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works, as being a ‘bloody battle’ where firms “must deliver greater value to customers or 
create comparable value at a lower cost”  (Porter, 1996: 62).  
On the other hand, the Blue Ocean strategy suggests that “firms should raise the standard of 
activities higher than the industry standard and offer consumers higher value than 
competitors” (Butler, 2008:19). Furthermore, firms should redefine market’s frontiers and 
keep focus on a long-term strategy being aware of the inevitability of changing it over time.  
In order to implement it, the authors suggest a 4-step framework to redesign the new value 
curve, called the Strategy Canvas, which is a valuable tool to find Blue Oceans designed by Kim 
and Mauborgne. By using it, firms are able to analyze the weight consumers put on different 
attributes, and therefore shift the market focus to non-consumers, which place different 
weights on the existing attributes and even value new ones, translating this analysis into value 
creation (Kim & Mauborgne, 2004). 
 
Figure 9 - 4-Steps framework to redesign a value curve
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In this way, firms can achieve success, which Colin Butler (2008:171) states to happen “not 
from battling competition but by making the competition irrelevant”.  
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 Source: Author , adapted from Butler (2008: 170) 
Raising a small number of activities in the value chain above the industry 
standard 
Reducing activities that fall below the industry standard 
Eliminating activities which the industry takes for granted 








3.5.3. The introduction of a Blue Ocean Strategy in The Middle 
East by SMEs 
As above described, nations have distinctive business cultures which affect not only new 
entrants’ strategies but also strategic change itself.  
In his study, Butler (2008:171) identifies resistance to change as “one of the greatest failures of 
many industrial management”. Leveraging from the work of Kim and Mauborgne on the Blue 
Ocean Strategy, the author findings conclude that SMEs, for their size, easier decision-making 
and therefore, faster reaction to environmental change, place more importance on opening up 
uncontested marked space and on focusing on non-costumers and their similarities in order to 
grow than MNEs. 
For this matter, “SMEs need to cut across multicultural boundaries among Arab, Asian, 
European, Australian, American, African and Latin America consumers” (Butler, 2008:176) 
                                                          
21





0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Competing Factors 
Blue Ocean Strategic Move 















“The key to a Blue Ocean strategic approach is to maintain high quality in only a small number 
of activities in the value chain rather than maintain the same level (…) across all the value 
chain activities” (Butler 2008:177).  
The author concludes that for winning a first-mover advantage in the UAE by applying a Blue 
Ocean Strategy, firms should endeavor the domestic market leadership. In these high-growth 
multicultural markets, there is great potential to attract new customers by changing prices of 
some activities in the value chain, and in this way, to come up with a different product for 
different consumers, which allows them to redefine market boundaries (Butler, 2008). 
Other studies reveal that the optimal strategy to sustain in the long term is not to decide 
between either a Blue Ocean or a Red Ocean, but to blend the two strategies. The underlying 
reason is that a firm which is able to be sustainable in a competitive market in the short term 
will have the funds to proceed to a Blue Ocean in order to succeed in the long term. (Burke et. 




IV | Teaching Note 
4.1 Case Summary  
 
ISA – Intelligent Sensing Anywhere, a Portuguese small to medium sized company in the 
technological field, with a turnover of 5,4 million euros in the year of 2011, was present in 5 
continents through subsidiaries and sales representatives. It created and developed products 
and solutions for different markets such as fuel distribution, energetic and hydric efficiency, 
environmental monitoring and intelligent houses and cities. 
By 2008, the firm had opened its first subsidiaries in Brazil, Spain and France. Although the 
activities in the European market were running as planned, ISA South America was not up to 
their expectations, as it entered with “the wrong strategy, the wrong partner and the wrong 
resources”,  
Henrique Pereira, the global managing director of the energy & utilities business unit at ISA, 
was hired in 2010 to analyze and develop strategies to enter new markets. After months of 
meetings with his team, studying the options that would be more profitable and consistent 
with ISA’s strategy, they came up with four possibilities:  China, Brazil, United States of 
America and United Arab Emirates.  
One chosen market for ISA to open physical facilities was Brazil, where ISA opened a wholly-
owned subsidiary, enjoying the profits its main client, SABESP, would bring. A completely 
different strategy from the previous one, adapted to a key market.  
Another market chosen among the options around North Africa and the Middle East was Egipt 
which seemed to be the best one, for its geography and demography and for the network ISA 
had at the time.  
Wahid Tawfik, was the right local partner. Besides being the Managing Director of Calensia, a 
consulting firm which covered ISA’s requirements, Mr. Tawfik had previously worked with ISA 
while he was the CEO of DuPont Group in Egypt. This relationship led him to assume the chair 
of Managing Director of ISA Middle East in Cairo in early 2012, along with a team of six 
professionals: two Portuguese and four Egyptians. Both partners soon found out that the 
market was too extensive with too many distinct characteristics. Thus, the Egyptian operation 
focused on the North African market and Henrique took the lead of the UAE market.  
The International Joint Venture was running quite smoothly during the first semester of 2012.  
ISA, as a group, had accomplished a much-desired goal. ISA was the first Portuguese company 
to be admitted at the NYSE Alternext, the equity trading market for small to medium sized 
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companies. This would, on one hand, translate into higher exposure, responsibility and 
transparency of the firm, but on the other hand, in a higher easiness to find new investors.  
Soon after this, in July, Egypt, the country so known for participating in the Arab Spring since 
2011, leveraged its conflicts when Mohammed Morsi, one of the leaders of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, winning the Egyptian elections with 51,73% of the votes.  
ISA’s staff and managers were concerned that the raw division of the country between the 
Islamist governance and the moderate Muslim, Christian and liberal opposition would trigger a 
civil war, diminishing the investment in the country and increasing insecurity.  
By November 2012, the CEO, José Basilio Simões, called Henrique for a meeting, in order to 
make a final decision on whether to divest in the IJV, end it and transfer the investment or to 
try to hold it until the storm went away. The decision would define the future of that market 
for ISA, a market that could not be disregarded. Furthermore, ISA would also have to take into 
account the physical security, issue its image upon its stakeholders, and the consequences of 
such a decision on the whole group.  
 
4.2 Learning Objectives 
 
The present case study aims to address the importance that cultural differences take in the 
business world, and how initial perceptions might affect the change of strategic objectives in 
companies that want to internationalize. 
By exploring how a technological SME built up its reputation by exploring the global market as 
part of its corporate strategy and the constraints it had in the way, the case study focus on 
some of the decision making processes required to internationalize within the technological 
field.  
Moreover, students are challenged to comprehend the pros and cons of strategic alliances as 
well as the motives that might make some alliances to fail in stages of the process. Those can 
go beyond internal issues of the partnership and can involve stakeholders, and the host 
country social, economic and political environment. 
Regarding strategic alliances, it is important to realize that the level of competences, resources 
and knowledge of the firm willing to internationalize should be the grounds to draw the profile 
of the partner which would be able to put off those weaknesses.  
Innovation and R&D as competitive advantages is another issue for discussion, due to the 
importance of constant disruption of patterns and products in a fast pacing market, such as 
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the technological one. In this way, Blue Ocean strategies appear clearly related to firms that 
have been able to survive, by altering their value curve in order to reach new demand. 
At last, through the lenses of the decision maker of a stable International Joint Venture in an 
emergent market, students are required to come up with recommendations for a firm that is 
required to reduce the impact on the Joint Venture of the political crisis lived in Cairo. Taking 
into account the need to sustain the businesses in course and also to assure that the firm is not 
jeopardizing the security of its workers, its liability towards the stakeholders and the future 
success of ISA in the Middle East, students would be forced to debate and balance a variety of 
subjects.  
Firstly, how a firm in the position of a foreign investor should react in the face of a host 
country’s political, economic and social crises; secondly, how each decision – such as the 
maintenance, the dissolution or the transfer of the IJV to another country – would address 
each stakeholder’s interests and how viable it is.  
 
 
4.3 Assignment Questions 
Those are provided in order to help students prepare for case discussion.  
 
1. How was ISA able to compete internationally? 
 
2. In November 2012, which were the most relevant markets for ISA? 
 
3. If ISA decides to continue on the Middle East countries, will the investment be 
sustainable for the company? 
 
4. Picture yourself as the CEO of ISA. You are now facing one of the toughest 
decisions on the firm’s internationalization strategy that can change the future 
of the company. What decision would you make? Justify your answer 
considering ISA’s strategic options at the time, evaluating each of stakeholder’s 






4.4 Class Plan 
With the aim of helping an instructor to develop a structure that could be useful for using the 
case in a class discussion, a set of topics and their analysis is now proposed.   
Assignment Question 1: How was ISA able to compete internationally? 
1. Describe ISA’s industry and how was it able to differentiate from its main 
competitors in the market.  
2. What role does innovation play for this company? (Suggestion: investment on 
Technological R&D) 
3. Describe the company’s strategy and how did it influence its success. (Suggestion: 
Key success factors) 
4. Explain the value ISA brings to its clients on the Energy business unit. (Suggestion: 
Business Intelligence processes’ contribution on companies’ value chain) 
Assignment Question 2:  In November 2012, which were the most relevant 
markets for ISA? 
5. What was the strategy applied to the Middle East and North African countries? 
6. What were the main factors delaying the entrance? (Suggestion: Hofstede 
dimensions analysis) 
7. Why did ISA decided to enter Egypt with a strategic alliance? What is the outcome 
of the Joint-venture so far?  (Suggestion: Strategic Alliances’ analysis) 
8. Assume ISA has the opportunity to form an IJV with a MNE leader in the area of 
technology. Indicate the main risks that might follow this strategic alliance 
(Suggestion: predatory alliances) 
Assignment Question 3: If ISA decides to continue on the Middle East market, will 
the investment be sustainable for the company? 
9. What were ISA’s investment and strategic decisions before 2012 that went wrong 




10. What were the main drivers for ISA to enter the Asian market and how can ISA 
sustain its strategic advantage in Shenzen? (threats of sustainability) 
11. Do you think ISA applied a Blue Ocean Strategy in the Middle East? 
 
Assignment Question 4:  
12. Picture yourself as the CEO of ISA. You are now facing one of the toughest 
decisions on the firm’s internationalization strategy that can change the future of the 
company. What decision would you make? Justify your answer considering ISA’s 
strategic options at the time, evaluating each of stakeholder’s perspectives and the 
company’s best interests.  
 
4.5 Analysis 
1. Describe ISA’s industry and how was it able to differentiate from its main competitors in 
the market.  
ISA is in the field of telemetry, measuring and optimizing energetic efficiency. This technology-
based industry is highly competitive, mainly at the international level, due to the constant 
speed of innovation and the investment international firms make on research and 
development. ISA specialization in telemetry solutions through GSM applied to the monitoring 
of tanks, nets, and gas meters, made it a world leader in this field. Its clients were mainly gas 
companies. Furthermore, for customizing all of its solutions to its clients’ needs, the firm was 
able to differentiate from its competitors who offered lined-up solutions and gain customers’ 
trust and loyalty. For better understanding, the Michael Porter’s 5 forces analysis on the 
Telemetry Industry is now going to be drawn. A brief explanation on the differences between 
the industry in the 90’s and in 2013 is also going to be described since the technological 
market where ISA built its start-up that allowed it to beat competition is completely different 
from the reality of the present situation.  
Threat of new entrants: 
One of the determinants of the industry attractiveness is, according to Porter (1985), the 
threat of new entrants. The telemetry market, belonging to the technological field, was in the 
90’s quite unknown in Portugal and was slowly growing on a global scale. Although its target is 
mainly the B2B segment, the investment on technological R&D needed was too high in the 90’s 
and the majority of technological firms did not have the capital to support the costs of 
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technology and R&D to develop products for a niche – it involved too much risk. However, as 
time went by, technological barriers decreased, and firms started investing in business 
intelligence processes. Due to its patents, ISA was able to protect itself from these threats and 
to become the leader of the Oil & Gas telemetry solutions while some new firms were entering 
the market with few or no experience at all. 
Technological change can lead to a two-ways’ street, as it can increase or diminish entry 
barriers. This is the era where companies and governments are taking more measures on 
energetic efficiency and environmental care but it is also the era when technology is most 
advanced. What this means for companies is that the technological pace nowadays, will easily 
bring more competitors into the game, introducing substitute products. 
The global financial crisis also had an impact on this dimension. In the most affected 
economies, such as Portugal, there has been a decrease in foreign investment and in external 
financing (EU funds, business angels and bank loans) which largely decreased the capacity of 
firms to be able to compete in these markets, due to the existing financial cost.  
Although ISA has the technological know-how and the experience on its side as an incumbent 
firm, the technological pace and thus innovative solutions, mainly internationally, might 
reduce ISA’s market share and number of clients. In this way, the threat of new entrants on 
the telemetry market is considered to be medium, as ISA’s experience and international 
reputation can assure ISA’s competitiveness in the market.  
Telemetry and buyer power 
The bargaining power of buyers is mainly determined by the offer options in the market. As 
ISA’s target is mainly the B2B segment, switching costs and differentiation, two main reasons 
that lead buyer’s decision-making processes, show an optimistic perspective. On one hand, 
being a leader in the segment diminishes the bargaining power of buyers, as its innovative 
products and processes lead ISA to achieve international awards in the Oil & Gas segment but 
on the other hand, the disruption of the market by a competitor might easily shift the buyer’s 
power.  
Moreover, this industry has high switching costs, as most buyers undertake projects of millions 
for the installation and later monitoring of the telemetry solutions (for example, for the gas 
tanks referred in the Case Study) and as so, changing to other supplier would not put off the 
costs of this previous investment.  
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The growing concern on energetic efficiency and monitoring solutions has increased the 
demand for these products, faster than the pace of growth of companies which can compete 
with ISA.  
However, the crisis has slowed down international transactions and decreased the demand for 
energetic efficiency products, as on one hand allows firms to be cost-effective, but on the 
other hand, also decreases the willingness of companies to invest on non-core strategies.  
The development of the B2C channel will permit ISA to explore the international market that 
has great potential as well, due to the growing established international laws on energetic 
efficiency which will decrease the buyer’s bargaining power. Furthermore, ISA’s business 
model is based on diversifying the risk, through different markets and segments, which allows 
it to avoid the dependence on important clients such as BP.  
Thus, one can conclude that in 2012 the bargaining power of buyers is medium due to B2B 
channels, but in the near future it will decrease due to environmental legislation for the 
household, which will increase the demand for energetic efficiency solutions. 
Bargaining Power of Suppliers 
In what concerns the bargaining power of ISA’s suppliers, it has been decreasing from decade 
to decade. Due to the increasing reputation and innovative solutions of ISA in the industry, 
ISA’s ability to build a large international network made it reach multiple suppliers from which 
it can surpass the punctual scarce of one entity without any dependence. This issue is stressed 
out in the Case Study, by the strategic alliance with the Chinese supplier, which lowered the 
productions costs. However, in the early 90’s the company lacked this network, being less 
powerful in its relationship with suppliers.  
Thus, one can consider the bargaining power of suppliers to be low, due to the increasing 
independence of ISA on this issue.  
Threat of substitute products 
When ISA took its first steps it was a micro enterprise with ambition and knowledge that 
turned up to be a market leader in gas telemetry. Innovation and market disruption are usually 
unexpected, mainly in the fast-paced technological field, and can easily change the game 
backwards. However, ISA continues to develop innovative solutions, such as the ones for the 
development of smart cities, which have been mastered by ISA for years and only now are on 
the spot for discussion.  
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 One can conclude that although ISA has innovative products and the telemetry industry 
requires long term R&D investment, market disruption can come, as ISA did, for any micro 
company, thus making this a medium threat.  
Rivalry among competitors  
Although ISA is the market leader on the Oil & Gas segment solutions, it competes with MNE’s 
such as Schneider, Siemens, ABB, Honeywell, Pacific Controls and Johnson Controls outside its 
niche market, making ISA more vulnerable to the this force since its early years. Due to its 
innovative products and customized sales process, ISA was able to take advantage of being a 
SME and conquered big clients using them as a reference for leveraging its international 
recognition. Furthermore, the recent inclusion in NYSE Alternext and its leadership of the M2M 
segment on Oil & Gas have also increased its market share. However, that can be threatened 
by MNEs capabilities of setting the hurdle higher, innovating at a rhythm that cannot be 
sustained by the resources of a SME. The Portuguese financial crisis has brought the 
contraction of the energy business unit, due to the fact that it was highly depend on the 
national market.  
To face this threat, ISA is daily focused on its core activity: developing business intelligence 
solutions on telemetry, the one where it gains its competitive advantage internationally. 
In this context, one can say that the rivalry among incumbents on the telemetry sector is high 
due to the number of MNEs with large experience, knowledge and resources that are 
competing directly with ISA in some of the activities of the value chain.  
Porter evaluated the attractiveness of an industry as low when all of these five forces were 
high (Porter, 1985). As we can see, telemetry is a very specific field of the technological 
industry, where the higher chances of a firm to survive among incumbent firms are in its ability 
to disrupt markets and to develop carefully-planned strategies. 
In this way we can conclude that the industry was attractive for the evolution of technological 
change, which consequently lowered barriers to entrance, and to the energy business, due to 
new legislation imposed by EU, Brazil and China. On the other hand, the attractiveness 
diminishes once one analyzes the rivalry in the market and the threat of substitute products.  
By making this analysis it was clear to perceive that ISA’s business model and its disruptive 
products were the main causes of ISA’s recognition and success in 2012. Technological change 
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will turn the game backwards once another disruptive technology enters the market and 
monopolizes one segment due to its innovative capabilities.  
 
2. What role does innovation play for this company? (Suggestion: investment on 
Technological R&D) 
It is important to realize the importance that technological R&D has in a technological firm. If 
one wants to become a pioneer and disrupt the existent market with its technology, the need 
to prioritize the investment in this area becomes vital, in order to achieve a competitive 
advantage. Thus, firms should leverage their internal capacity in R&D and make it the heart of 
the company. As so, another issue becomes relevant. For a SME to compete internationally in 
this area, the scarce resources require a good management in order not to be wasted and 
allow the focus on the development of R&D practices. And for that, firms need a well-defined 
strategy. ISA’s growth strategy associates continuous innovation to technologic development 
in the search for emergent markets with lower competitive pressure. This means that ISA’s 
efforts and investment on TR&D are quite high relatively to other investment items. This is 
crucial for the success of its products and to tap gaps in the market before its competitors, 
creating unique competences that guarantee a competitive advantage. All of its products are a 
result of this investment on TR&D along with a carefully planned strategy and had the power 
to leverage ISA to an international standard of technological pioneer. 
 
3. Describe the company’s strategy and how did it influence its success. (Key success 
factors) 
ISA applied a blue ocean strategy in its internationalization as it entered in low exploited 
markets in this industry that showed great potential with products for a specific niche (such as 
Brazil  and the Middle East).  
Building up from a disruptive technology of telemetry and remote control, the firm was able to 
create a discontinuous innovation which will, at its turn, become an evolutionary technology 
once its patent expires. ISA’s creation of smart cities, a concept for which it develops 
monitoring and remote control solutions, is one of the most valuable examples of a 
discontinuous innovation which has gained international recognition.  
One of ISA’s Key Success Factors, was the ability to create value for its customers, through 
tailoring its solutions to its customers need, analyzing the existing problems and making 
proposals for optimal solutions.  
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Furthermore, ISA had a high return on investment (ROI) on its projects, due to a careful 
financial analysis and also because the implementation of its solutions requires the clients to 
pay a fixed annual fee for the equipment, in addition to the costs of installation and further 
equipment acquisition. This fee for the equipment installed in all its clients guaranteed ISA’s 
working capital needs. 
The attained percentage of efficiency was another advantage; as ISA primes for excellence in 
all of its areas and had already proved the benefits of its products. The firm is also a strong 
believer that a fine post-sale support system creates customer loyalty, good word-of-mouth 
and therefore, makes sure all installation and repairs are done as soon as possible. These 
factors that might seem details are actually the key that opened their doors for the whole 
world.  
ISA had always played the game with an international vision for its strategy. For that reason, 
ISA had soon started to participate (and to win) relevant international contests. 
 
4. Explain the value ISA brings to its clients on the Energy business unit. (Business 
Intelligence processes’ contribution on companies’ value chain) 
The solutions developed by ISA on the energy business unit are mostly related to energetic 
efficiency for the household. These solutions include a variable number of equipment that 
measures the consumption of electricity, gas and water, and cross them with the measure of 
environmental data such as humidity, temperature and CO2 allowing a cost reduction, a more 
efficient resource management and increasing environmental responsibility. These solutions 
can be used in industries, buildings and houses and soon its application will be mandatory due 
to international laws that establish climate change precautions.  
All this data can be found in detailed software applications, which permit that the final 
consumers analyze their consumption values on user-friendly platforms. 
 
Figure 11 - Business Intelligence Flow applied to ISA 
Although cost reduction and energetic efficiency might be perceived as evident valuable 
advantages for the final consumer, in what concerns B2B, where ISA’s clients are firms and 
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industries, this instrument has greater importance. For instance, by looking at a multinational 
firm which requires the analysis of data from millions of consumers, business intelligence (BI) 
comes as a process that simplifies all this analysis, acquiring, storing and simplifying the 
statistical results, allowing the firm to understand the customers’ needs and preferences easily 
and faster. For all the phases of the process to be well-done, the questions that BI use is 
supposed to answer should also be clear since its beginning in order to reach a straight-
forward and useful analysis of the results.  
Moreover, on a firm’s logistics perspective, BI can also come as a solution to realize the impact 
of the variable expenses on production, facilitating a cost reduction and a better decision 
making moves that might reinforce the company’s competitiveness.  
As so, the energy business unit brings advantages at different levels through its solutions – on 
cost, environmental, decision making, efficiency and analytical perspectives – creating value 
for both B2B and B2C channels. 
5. What was the strategy applied to the Middle East and North African countries? 
ISA found in the world map some geographical zones that stood out. North Africa and The 
Middle East, for instance, was one of them. The region is as known for the oil and gas reserves 
as for the prevailing religion of most of the countries, Islamism. Nevertheless, what has moved 
millions of firms to make business there was precisely the exploitation of oil and gas reserves’ 
potential. For ISA, this was an opportunity as well. Having both the Energy and the Oil & Gas 
business units, this area could be ISA’s golden egg. Firstly, due to the requirement of 
measuring the level of gas per tank, ISA’s offer would adjust perfectly in the telemetry and 
remote control technology those countries lacked and required. ISA started to study each 
country’s characteristics to implement its physical facilities. Ultimately, Egypt, with one of the 
largest populations of North Africa and being the main non-OPEC oil producer and dry natural 
gas producer in the whole continent22, was the chosen one.  
The choice of a strategic partner was based on the need to have someone local, that ISA 
trusted, whose network would reach potential clients, and mainly, a partner whose strengths 
matched ISA’s weaknesses so that the partnership was complementary both in resources, core 
business, knowledge and financially.  
It did not take long until the partners strategically divided the target market of the IJV headed 
by Wahid Tawfik. For a matter of market strategy consistency, the Egyptian office addressed to 
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the North African market while Henrique addressed the Middle East region directly from 
Portugal.   
Still, the process of entering the market would remain the same. Firstly, to contact well-known 
enterprises in the field of oil, gas and energy, analyze their problems and make a project 
proposal. When the project was implemented, they would use it as an example to leverage 
their business by creating local awareness of their brand.  
This strategy is usually applied to several firms, in an attempt to attract new clients using 
successful pilot projects for locally renowned companies. In an international context, the new 
partner will help reducing the liabilities of foreignness, newness and smallness, three liabilities 
that SMEs have to surpass to be able to succeed in doing business abroad.  
 
6. What were the main factors delaying the entrance? (Suggestion: Hofstede dimensions 
analysis) 
Cultural differences have been widely known as barriers to a firm’s internationalization since 
the first steps of globalization. Europe and The Middle East are distinct geographies where one 
could evaluate the differences between local culture, religion and politics. Hofstede has found 
in 1980 deeper gaps among them in terms of business culture. As the case study indicates, 
ISA’s team found difficulties in entering the market as the development of the relationship 
took longer than expected, due to the need to establish a trustful relationship before 
undertaking any contract. 
The following chart (Figure 1223), compares the evaluation of both countries, Portugal and 
Egypt, for each of Hofstede’s dimensions in an attempt to better understand the dissimilarities 
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In terms of Power Distance (PDI) and Individualism vs Collectivism (IDV) both countries score 
similar results. Firstly, on the PDI dimension, both countries show an acceptance of 
hierarchical division between the boss and the employee. Both cultures score very low on 
individualism, what states the great importance given to groups, be them family, firms’ team 
work or communities. Decisions are not only made thinking about the self, but mainly on the 
groups’ benefit perspective.  
In what concerns Masculinity vs Feminity (MAS), both have relatively low results, with a 
considerable difference. Religion and social behavior are expected to have great influence in 
Egypt’s evaluation (45), as around 90% of the population is Muslim24, where inequality 
between genders is high, undermining the role of women on the society. For example, by law, 
women’s testimony on court counts half as much of men’s testimony while WHO25 reports the 
outrageous 91% of women who suffered genital mutilation across their lifetime26. These non-
business related facts reveal a deeply underdeveloped society. However, this dimension is 
associated to the perceived values in life that distinguish men and women in what defines 
success rather than the social role of women in society. As so, one might analyze this score as 
mirroring a quite feminine country, which might be explained by the management style, where 
the importance given to life quality puts off competitiveness.   
Regarding the Uncertainty Avoidance sphere, Portugal has one of the highest values among all 
countries (104). Although the Egyptian value is also quite high (80), the Portuguese peak shows 
the necessity of strict rules and moral beliefs and the intolerance to new ideas and innovation. 
These may reflect a very assertive behavior in business, the need to meet deadlines and to 
follow moral codes.  
There is no official data on the last variable for Egypt but I believe that for its culture and social 
dynamics – importance given to trust, to business partners’ relationships and to the future – 
added to the comprehension of similar cultures scores, Egyptian score should be quite high. 
Portugal, however, appears as a short-term oriented culture (30), which seems to be 
consistent within western societies. Traditional behaviors, urge for quick decisions, and lack of 
future-oriented decisions such as small propensity to save are among the Portugal’s dimension 
characteristics.  
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In conclusion, these dissimilarities influence the international negotiation between the two 
countries, mainly in what concerns uncertainty avoidance and long-term vs short-term 
orientation where the impact on personal and professional relationships is higher.  
7. Why did ISA decided to enter Egypt with a strategic alliance? What is the outcome of 
the Joint-venture so far?  (Suggestion: Strategic Alliances’ analysis and IJV partner 
selection criteria)  
ISA’s decision of entering Egypt through a strategic alliance was mainly because it recognized 
the importance of having a partner who had local knowledge and local experience  (in order to 
reduce the liability of foreignness and newness, respectively) and thus to be able to guarantee 
the feasibility and profitability of the investment in such a distinctive market. Although it could 
have chosen other types of entry modes such as Licensing, the firm had chosen an equity 
mode of entry as the potential partner met ISA’s requirements. Firstly, both partners 
complemented each other needs on resources and on the relatedness of the business, being 
ISA’s a supplier of telemetry solutions, and Wahid Tawfik, a consultant specialized in the area 
of energy, with wide knowledge on risk analysis and strategy development. Moreover, Mr. 
Tawfik also had a past association with ISA, due to previous deals between ISA and Calensia. In 
what concerns the relatedness of foreign partner’s and IJVs’ business, the complementarity 
between both parts that successfully sustained the IJV for almost a year lets me conclude that 
the last selection criteria was accomplished. Thus, both partners accomplished the desired 
effectiveness on the IJV, built on the acknowledgement of both partner’s CSFs that contributed 
to the development of the IJVs strategy. On an internal level, one might conclude that the IJV 
was performing well and that it would have a long-term durability. 
 
8. Assume ISA has the opportunity to form an IJV with a MNE leader in the area of 
technology. Indicate the main risks that might follow this strategic alliance (Suggestion: 
predatory alliances) 
To address the risks of establishing a partnership between SMEs and MNEs, it is important to 
stress their contrasting characteristics. As the pioneers of globalization, multinational firms 
take the market leadership of most industries (Boeing in Aerospace and Defense; Bank of 
America Corp. in Banking, Time Warner in Media, ExxonMobil in Oil & Gas Operations; AT&T in 
telecommunications; Hewlett-Packard in Technology Hardware & Equipment27). However, 
SMEs constitute the engine of most economies thus being of great importance to the 
countries’ GDP – in the European Union, for example, SMEs constitute 99,8% of the non-
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financial enterprises guaranteeing 66,7% of the jobs28. They constitute the roots of innovation 
and give lights to entrepreneurial spirit, being the engine of competitiveness. 
As we can see both MNEs and SMEs are extremely important and each of them has its role in 
the economy. But if MNEs and SMEs bring disparate benefits, why shouldn’t firms engage in 
strategic alliances between MNEs and SMEs to create synergies? 
Although both types of firms bring value to the global economy, the two parts will have higher 
probability of successfully co-exist on a supplier/buyer relationship of goods and services or 
through firm acquisition. Because they have different strategic capabilities, alliances such as 
International Joint Ventures might become a source of predatory behavior between partners.  
Even if the core business is complementary, there is unequal legitimacy in foreign markets, in 
what concerns reputation and resources. 
At an external level, the alliance with the MNE might be seen as an advantage for a SME as in 
this way the liabilities of smallness, newness and foreignness have been previously surpassed 
by the MNE’s recognition in the market. In what concerns its reputation, even though ISA is 
listed in Alternext and is an internationally awarded firm, a multinational company would 
probably still be more concerned about the possible IJV dissolution impact in its image. This, in 
addition to its higher capacity of sustaining capital losses, translates into higher longevity.  
However, distinct strategic orientations can have a negative impact on the IJV’s performance. 
As the MNE would have higher bargaining power than ISA, since ISA would be dependent on 
its knowledge and resources, ISA might found itself in a manipulative situation where the MNE 
uses the IJV for its own economic gain instead of for the IJV’s profit, therefore becoming a 
predatory alliance.  
This situation might be avoided through the increase of ISA’s ownership percentage in the IJV 
and it would also diminish once ISA gains better knowledge and experience in the host country 
market. 
One can conclude, that when the parents’ firm structure is as distinct as it would be in this 
situation, IJV control is required by the parent or by a neutral third-party, for no one to take 
advantage of the partnership for its own good, to assure that IJV’s goals are accomplished and 
the partnerships remains stable in the long-term.  
 
9. What were ISA’s investment and strategic decisions before 2012 that went wrong in the 
foreign market? Why did they fail? (Suggestion: Reasons for market divestment) 
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ISA’s internationalization strategies did not always go for the best.  When ISA tried to make its 
way to the USA market in 2010, it ultimately found a great obstacle to its entrance.  The 
entrance required bureaucracies such as certifications and the need for the product to be 
modified to obey commercial regulatory laws. Plus, they found themselves in a red ocean, as 
the technological offer in USA constraints the value of ISA’s offer. The number of competitors, 
their products, their dimension and their way into the market, would be quite hard to surpass.  
Barriers to entrance are well-known as one of the causes of internationalization. However, 
once a firm is established in a market, it will find new obstacles to its successful progress, as it 
happened in Brazil in 2008, when ISA opened a JV. The partner was not up to ISA’s needs for 
complementarity, and the JV was not achieving efficiency through the implementation of its 
strategy either. Consequently, ISA decided to divest and to later redesign the whole strategy 
for the Brazilian market from scratch, but now with more experience on an emerging country 
growing at two digits. Although Brazil was once a Portuguese colony, roots that to some point 
imply a cultural similarity, one does not see the same uncertainty avoidance and urgency from 
the other side of the ocean. The following chart (Figure 13) intents to compare Hofstede 
dimensions’ scores in both countries – Portugal and Brazil in order to enhance the importance 
of the effect of culture discrepancy in a JV.  
 
Figure 13 - Hoftede's Cultural Dimensions: Portugal vs Brazil
29
 
In spite of the common thought inside companies that divestment might be a great loss; it may 
come as the best decision on a non-core asset or subsidiary that a firm can make. Investments 
are worth when they are paying off, and when they are not paying off, leaders should carefully 
analyze the asset’s future value to decide on its worthiness. This decision should be looked 
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upon as a wise one and as a (quite expensive) learning experience, instead of the common 
perception of failure, since internationalization requires deep foreign market knowledge.   
 
 
10.  What were the main drivers for ISA to enter the Asian market and how can ISA sustain 
its strategic advantage in Shenzen? (Suggestion: threats of sustainability) 
ISA primarily entered the market with the prospects of diminishing its production costs and of 
establishing a network in the country, opening a commercial gate towards an economy 
growing exponentially. At a first stage, in 2009, they found a supplier of electronic equipment 
in Shenzen that could diminish part of the costs ISA had in producing its items, thus making 
ISA’s production cost-effective for high quantities. The agreement that started on a contract 
manufacturing basis had the intention of being later transformed into a subsidiary, once ISA 
found the right partner. However, the Chinese market is very well known for its threats of 
imitation of foreign products and services, and this has been a problem for multinational 
companies in the past years. This is one of the threats to sustainability and the most common 
and problematic for foreign investors in Eastern countries, for their easiness in copying and 
selling for a lower price, decreasing the value of the original one. In ISA’s case, being in the 
technological field would even attract more attention for the “counterfeiting market” because 
its quality products may be very demanded in the next few years in China, with its huge 
population and enormous environmental problems, having 16 of the most polluted cities in 
the whole world. However, in the last years, China had made a turn, and is now the number 
one investor of renewable technology globally, which represents 17% of its total energy 
supply30,31.  
With a new plan for environmental development, China will become a great market for 
technologies in the telemetry area. It is indeed a huge opportunity for ISA at this point to have 
the right timing and explore the market. However, in order to avoid the imitation of its 
products there are some steps that can reduce this danger. To register the trademark in all the 
steps of the value chain - every jurisdiction from supplier until the buyer must have this 
register – is the most valuable one. After that, having someone inside the company which job 
is to prevent this situation from happening, controlling commercialization both locally and 
online.  
Unfortunately, the perfect solution is far from being found. The Chinese market won’t change 
as they are extremely reliant on counterfeiting goods. For example, in 2010 a little Chinese 
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town announced inspection to all stores for counterfeiting goods and 90% of them closed their 
doors right away32. Truth being said, China’s competitiveness in the global world has much 
leverage for their ability to replicate any product for a lower cost. This fact, which is a problem 
to foreign investors is, on the other hand, a very profitable business for the local population 
and is, therefore, far from being put to an end by the government. In a world where there is no 
such thing as a perfect market for a foreign firm to enter in, ISA will have to adapt and prevent 
counterfeiting in order to have a sustainable development in widening its international 
presence. 
 
11.  Do you think ISA applied a Blue Ocean Strategy in the Middle East?  
It is important to, at a first stage, distinguish what is a Blue Ocean Strategy. This strategy 
consists on creating new markets and new consumers in order to get away from the hard 
competitive environment (Red Ocean), by recreating its value chain with the aim of succeeding 
in an innovative way. Therefore, an analysis to the strategy canvas, the framework applied to 
develop a blue ocean strategy, should be done in order to perceive whether ISA have applied 
this strategy. 
 
Figure 14 - 4-Steps framework applied to ISA 
                                                          
32
 “THIS Is Why China Can't And Won't Try To Eliminate Fake Goods” 
 
 
• M2M (Machine to Machine Business) 
• Team exclusively dedicated to Business Intelligence 
• Expertise in technical product development deployed locally 
Raising a small number of activities in the value chain above the industry standard 
• Deliver all non-core activities of the value chain to the care of its partners 
• Privileged partnerships for specific core areas of the value chain 
Reducing activities that fall below the industry standard 
 
Eliminating activities which the industry takes for granted 
•Customization for local market 
•Smart Logistics service 
•Business Intelligence Offer 
•Special Real Time Reporting 
Creating innovative activities 
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Through the analysis of the firm’s strategy, which begins with the conceptualization of its 
products, and goes through the sales process, reaching different markets, one can perceive the 
flow of the Strategy Canvas, which lacks the elimination of activities that the industry takes for 
granted. Although this step is missing, we can find that by passing all non-core activities of the 
value chain to its partners, the firm was able to focus on what really matters and distinguishes 
it, without eliminating the non-core activities as they were now taken care of through ISA’s 
partnerships.  
ISA understood the importance of striving for excellence in what really distinguished its 
business. Therefore, on the first phase and unlike its competitors, one can find that the firm 
dedicated a specialized team to focus on business intelligence, as its core activity, finding the 
means to lead M2M33 segment in the business area of Oil & Gas, in which telemetry appears as 
the bridge of communication. This area is the grand stake of ISA in the Middle East, the most 
profitable region in the world in Oil & Gas segment. Moreover, their expertise in technical 
product development deployed locally raises its competitiveness in every country.  
In what concerns innovative solutions, ISA was able to introduce in its sales process problem 
analysis and product customization adapted to the local market. This activity might be 
considered as innovative if one understands that the technological industry is usually lucrative 
for disrupting patterns but also for working as a mass market, which permits reaching 
economies of scale. Furthermore, this adaptation brings more value to the consumer, be it 
B2B, B2C or in B2B2C flows, humanizing the business by creating a relationship of proximity, 
trust and loyalty with the client, taking advantage of the positive side of small firms, with the 
local expertise advantage of a multinational.  
With the Smart Logistics service ISA allows the final client to optimize its consumption and the 
use of telemetry. It has now the plans to introduce more value to it, as tool that brings 
easiness to people’s life.  
This widen business intelligence offer, is not often seen in SMEs. ISA endeavors for TR&D in 
business intelligence with the means to create solutions to any problem, and for that it has to 
move at the pace of international competitors. Furthermore, ISA bets on its special real time 
reporting to innovate, delivering information right on time.  
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With the high capacity for investment in the Oil & Gas segment in that region, ISA will now find 
a lot of competitors in the Middle East. Nevertheless, ISA’s offer is one of a kind, and in low 
developed societies with high growth economies – such as we could find in Egypt in 2012, this 
market has been quite unexploited (only 10% of the world’s gas tanks were using it).  
Adding to the analysis done to the strategy canvas, I therefore conclude that ISA has indeed 
applied a blue ocean strategy, reaching markets with great potential but low exploited, 
running away from the “bloody battle” and recreating demand through its optimized value 
chain and product range offer that it brought to Egypt.  
In Kim’s and Mauborgne’s words, a blue ocean is made from the within of the firm, meaning 
that it is the conceived strategy that will affect the structure and environment, not the usual 
other way around. And that is what ISA did. It recreated itself, held on to and improved core 
activities and removed the others, with the aim of building a smart world.   
12. Picture yourself as the CEO of ISA. You are now facing one of the toughest decisions on 
the firm’s internationalization strategy that can change the future of the company. 
What decision would you make? Justify your answer considering ISA’s strategic options 
at the time, evaluating each of stakeholder’s perspectives and the company’s best 
interests. 
During the year of 2012, ISA Middle East had lived an intensive route. From the 
implementation of the offices in the beginning of the year, the engagement of its first clients 
and the implementation of the first pilot 
projects, the IJV was running as expected. After 
six months of existence, the implementation of 
the first projects was successful and most of 
the recognized firms in the local market were 
already engaged in the process.  
Although most countries in North Africa and 
the Middle East are constantly flashed by the 
media for its social and political hazardous 
circumstances, mainly since the Arab Spring 
revolution that has taken off in 2011, Egypt has 
been the focus since the election of 
Mohammed Morsi. As the case study refers, 
the member of the Muslim Brotherhood was Figure 15 - Political Risk Index, 2013 
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the first democratically elected president and the 5th of the line, dividing the country in a 
conflict that went over political issues – it was strictly bonded to religious tensions. Such 
emerging countries, while being oil producers, will always be an attraction for international 
investors, and therefore corrupt governments’ revenues will always be unbalanced with the 
population quality of living.  In 2012, Egypt has been considered in high political risk for its very 
poor political freedom and medium societal gains. As one can see in Figure 1534, the situation 
did not improve in 2013, being Egypt ranked as the third country with higher political risk of 
the top twenty growth markets in the world, rank were it occupies the 17th position.  
Installed the chaos, the managers found urgency in making a decision on whether it would be 
worth to continue in the country. The strategy that would define the structure was threatened 
by the market conditions, with Egypt on the red spot for its striking instability and social 
revolution. 
For the analysis of this question, I am going to set forth the options that the company had at 
the time, with the pros and cons of each as well as the stakeholder’s perspective, in order to 
reach a better conclusion.  
Firstly, one should notice each of the stakeholder’s position35 on the future of ISA Middle East: 
 
Figure 16 - Stakeholder's Concerns on the Future of ISA Middle East 
 
With such concerns to be considered in the decision, the options and their impact have now to 
be drawn:  
Hold the IJV in Cairo and wait for the storm to go away  
                                                          
34
 Source: Maplecroft’s Political Risk Atlas (PRA) 2013 
35
 Only the stakeholders which could be affected by this decision are going to be considered 
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As the conflict is the main cause for the country’s instability, the advantage of holding the IJV 
in Cairo will be for ISA to be able to continue the operations after its resolution. However, how 
long was it going to last? For how long could the firm sustain the costs of an IJV in stand-by for 
an unforeseeable amount of time? Moreover, employee concerns on their own physical 
security, in addition to the shareholders and owners concerns, would be unsustainable to 
alleviate without a withdrawal. 
End the IJV and withdraw the market for a considerable time 
Considering the pros and cons of the last option, the end of the IJV would be a good option. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to consider the investment made in the market since the strategy 
was defined. It is also important to remember the contracts on hold due to the crisis and the 
potential profitability ISA could gain out of its clients.  
On one hand, this decision would be consistent and respectful for the security concerns, but 
ISA would lose the track of the market because the IJV timeline was insufficient to gain enough 
reputation and experience. And as the case indicates, you have to be in the market to actually 
know it.   
Furthermore, by leaving the market, ISA’s competitiveness would drop in that market, as a 
competitor will soon find its way in with the same vision for the oil & gas potential.  
Tranfer the IJV investment to another market in the same region  
The option of transferring the investment to another country that could also reach the same 
target market ends the strategic problem, but brings up other problems. For starters, 
transaction costs will obviously arise, as there is the need for market research, new office, new 
partner and a strategy adapted to the new market reality. This investment might be partially 
put off with the sale of the offices in Cairo. Dependent on the location choice, it would also 
please most stakeholders and assure ISA’s competitiveness and security in the region.  
Change the strategic alliance to a non-equity mode 
Ultimately, for ISA to safeguard its image, it could sell the offices in Cairo and make a 
commercial agreement with an interested technological firm of their trust, which would 
continue its projects on course. In this way, ISA could work as a supplier, maintain its products 
on the market and although it wouldn’t be able to work as a subsidiary, it would not have the 
high costs of holding for the storm to pass either.  
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In conclusion, there were many options on the table that could damage ISA. Even though it 
would be unable to please all perspectives, whatever the decision is, a combination of them 
might address the main concerns. However, a market where ISA can take such a leap in its 
internationalization, due to the potential of Oil & Gas in the region, could not be dismissed.  
If I was in seated on the administration office that day, with the data presented in the case 
study, I would have chosen to give a license agreement for the sale of my products in Egypt to 
an interesting firm with large experience and knowledge of the market, preferably one with 
reputation in the field of telemetry or, at least, of business intelligence solutions. As for the 
market, resilience is always a quality when it is done in an intelligent way and therefore, I 
would have not given up. Another investment would require money and time, but it would for 
sure be rewarded with a profitable business development in a new market. The choice of the 
market, as the research team had previously done when they have chosen Egypt to set up the 
IJV, would also be clarified with the exclusion of the ones with high risk indexes for investors, 
due to the probability of a civil war be triggered soon or due to the fragile political stability at 
the moment. That would have left me with UAE, Saudi Arabia and Jordan as potential markets 
for entrance36.  
In both Saudi Arabia and Jordan, the firm already had commercial relations through 
representatives to whom ISA had given a license agreement and the UAE were the financial 
center of the Middle East at the time. 
Among the United Arab Emirates, Dubai and Abu Dhabi are the most important and rich cities. 
As one can see in Figure 17, contrarily to most Arab economies, Dubai has a completely 
different offer for investors. Being attractive for investors worldwide, Dubai has high 
reputation and a mandatory location for the most internationalized companies in the last 
decade. It is the financial center of the UAE as well as its most developed location.  
But why is Dubai so developed compared to other economies surrounding it? Figure 17 
represents the main example of how blue ocean strategies can redefine the whole 
environment. With a $275.8 billion GDP in 2012, Dubai grew up to be one of the fast-growing 
economies worldwide, by diminishing its oil & gas revenue from 30 to 5 percent in a decade 
according to the government’s strategy. Among the characteristics that make it so appealing 
for foreign investors one can find a low language barrier, free trade zones, very low corporate 
                                                          
36
 Maplecroft’s Political Risk Atlas (PRA) 2013. 
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taxes, low complexity for setting up business and the freedom to repatriate 100% of capital 
and profits.  
 
Figure 17 - Dubai's Profit Proposition
37
 
Such reputation made Dubai an investors’ paradise. As the Oil & Gas business does not 
represent a great share of the whole economy of Dubai, ISA would not find a great amount of 
direct competitors. On the contrary, it would find better business opportunities still having the 
ability to reach the whole Middle Eastern countries that surround it with the benefit of not 
having the high risk to suffer from a political crisis.  
4.6 What Happened Next? 
Offices in Cairo 
Isa decided to cease the activities of ISA Middle East in the end of the year, given the existing 
social and political instability in Egypt. The transfer was done to local shareholders who closed 
the office and started its liquidation after January 31, 2013.  
The team 
The Portuguese expatriates in Cairo were later sent to the offices in Shenzen, as they were 
already experienced in controlling ISA’s operations abroad and were willing to go to the offices 
in China.  
                                                          
37
 Source: Kim and Mauborgne, 2009: 7 
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The Managing Director of ISA Middle East, Wahid Tawfik, went to Texas, in USA and is at the 
time working as an independent consultant, for he was not willing to live in the Egypt’s 
insecurity anymore.  
The Egyptian members of the team were willing to start their own company in Cairo, in spite of 
the instability– it is where their roots are.  
Representation Agreement  
The new company, EMS – Energy Management Solutions, undertook ISA’s contracts, clients 
and projects as it was a win-win situation for both companies. For ISA, it was an advantage 
that someone who already had been inside the company, with experience and knowledge of 
the sales process would “seal the deal” and carry on project development of the projects that 
had been on hold since the exacerbation of  Egypt’s situation. Moreover, ISA would maintain 
the possibility of continuing doing business in the country not only in the short-term, but over 
the years through a representation agreement with EMS.  
The Relocation 
The thought of ceasing activities in Egypt did not cease the willingness of continuing the 
exploitation of The Middle East. Although the instability in all the countries in the area would 
be hard to surpass, the Emirate of Dubai was clearly the financial center of the Middle East in 
2013. From a deep transformation and restructuration of the economy over the last 30 years 
due to the discovery of oil in the region, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had brought itself 
from an impoverished region to a modern state with high standards of living. 
Although the UAE were considerably affected by the world crisis, it remains attracting foreign 
investment through the Free Trade Zones of the region.  
Consequently, ISA is now in the process of relocation of the Cairo IJV’s investment to Dubai, 
where the firm already “found an interesting partner, a team and prospected new clients” – as 
Henrique Pereira stated.  
With the transfer of the IJV, the company was able to get out of a dangerous situation that it 
had in Egypt and to strive for better success in the crowded Dubai, while maintaining its 
presence in Cairo through representation.  
The strategy for Dubai is mainly focused on reaching the members of GCC (Gulf Cooperation 
Council), including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and all the states of UAE.  
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V | Conclusion 
My work on this dissertation enabled me to acknowledge the difficulties a SME needs to 
surpass in order to establish successful strategic alliances internationally. This allowed me to 
develop my perception on cultural dimensions and how, in a fast-paced world of technology, 
innovators are the ones taking the lead of the industry.  
Moreover, my interest in business administration grew up to be focused in international 
negotiation and in international strategic alliances, and thus, it was a pleasure to deepen my 
knowledge on these themes. On the contrary, increasing my knowledge on the flow of 
telemetry systems and business intelligence was harder. However, against my expectations, it 
brought on the appeal to work in the industry. For future research, I recommend this theme to 
be treated with financial data, to which I did not have access, and to be analyzed on a 3-year 
time scope, in order to better evaluate the financial impact on such decisions in SMEs.  
This master thesis aimed to send the message that the “business war” does not end once you 
are successful in a foreign country. The thesis highlights the case of ISA, a SME which was able 
to achieve innovation international awards, to reach more than 20 countries and to establish a 
stable IJV in Egypt. Still, the managers had to use their “intelligent senses” to step up to the 
options they had on their hands at that time, within a situation completely created by an 
external force, that is, the political upheaval lived in Egypt.  
This fact enlightens the reality of emerging countries where firms from developed countries 
are trying to catch the wave against saturated markets and their financial crisis, and end up 
finding themselves affected by the underdevelopment of those regions, which somehow 
impacts their business strategies. 
In fact, technological SMEs have great potential to accomplish international success, because 
their innovative capacities and higher flexibility make them more likely to opt for Blue Ocean 
strategies and disrupt the existing market. This business model requires firms to design 
strategies that take into account different market realities and, even more important and as a 
mandatory point for success, requires that a company has clear notion of the competences, 
resources and knowledge that it owns and that it lacks. In this way, companies will be able to 
find host country partners that match their needs, and, therefore, to build the grounds for a 
successful market entrance.  
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Finally, it was of great interest to realize the strategic decision making process in the resolution 
of this issue. ISA was able to: cease ISA Middle East and reallocate the expatriated employees – 
putting an end to the stakeholders concerns; Transfer the investment to start a new IJV in 
Dubai – a fast growing market that would assure ISA would be able to compete in the Middle 
Eastern Market; Change the strategic alliance in Cairo to a non-equity mode – assuring its 
clients would receive customer care and the implementation of the projects would be done.  
The firm was the global pioneer in the launch of telemetry solutions via GSM for the remote 
monitoring of tanks, grids and GPL counters in the 90’s, and that aims to create a smart world. 
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